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 The Constitution is primarily about power, the capacity of government actors to change 
legal rules and legal relations.  It is also to some extent about the duties of government actors and 
institutions, and imposes on them obligations that it is wrong not to fulfill.  These two functions 
of constitutional rules, setting out powers and imposing duties, are distinct from one another, and 
it is important not to confuse them.  The provisions of the Constitution that grant and limit the 
power of Congress are concerned exclusively with power and do not create duties.  They therefore 
are not the source of the obligations that Senators and Representatives have to ensure that their 
legislation is consistent with the Constitution.  Members of Congress do have obligations of that 
kind, but those obligations come from their role as legislators, and because of that role are flexible 
and not absolute.  There are circumstances in which a conscientious legislator may vote for 
legislation that the legislator believes to be partly unconstitutional.  By contrast, the constitutional 
provisions that grant authority to act conclusively, such as the provisions that empower the courts, 
do bring with them unqualified obligations to follow the law.  Power and duty interact differently 
depending on the kind of power involved.  Because the obligations of legislators concerning the 
constitutionality of legislation are flexible, they do not support the inference that legislation is 
necessarily valid or invalid on its face and not as applied.  But the text of the First Amendment, 
understood as dealing solely with the power and not the duty of Congress, does strongly suggest 
that it makes rules valid or invalid as such, so that all invalidity is facial invalidity.  The well-
established phenomenon of as-applied invalidity, and the severability of valid from invalid 
applications, can be explained consistently with this reading of the First Amendment.  Severability 
happens when Congress has implicitly or explicitly provided a fallback rule that is valid as such 
and that replaces the primary rule that is invalid on its face.  The First Amendment operates at the 
level of rules and not applications. 
Attention to text earns only professional scorn in constitutional law.  But 
when one among many constitutional limitations is literally directed against 
lawmaking, might the text perhaps embody a reason that even realists can 
respect?1 
Analysis of the Constitution’s conceptual apparatus generally must 
be found in the interstices of arguments concerning its substance.  
Whether religious practitioners are constitutionally entitled to ex-
emptions from generally applicable laws is a point of heated conten-
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 1 Hans A. Linde, “Clear and Present Danger” Reexamined:  Dissonance in the Brandenburg Con-
certo, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (1970). 
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tion.2  Entangled with it is the question whether and when legislative 
rules are valid as a whole, invalid as a whole, or valid in some, but on-
ly some, of their applications.  The conceptual issue, often put as the 
distinction between facial and as-applied invalidity, appears in many 
contexts.  An improved understanding of the problem would illumi-
nate a number of constitutional provisions and would help provide a 
better account of the tools with which the Constitution operates. 
Important and powerful recent work by Professor Nicholas 
Rosenkranz seeks to resolve the question of facial and as-applied inva-
lidity.  According to Professor Rosenkranz, constitutional provisions 
produce rule-level or application-level validity and invalidity depend-
ing on their addressee.  If a provision is directed to the legislature, 
the way the First Amendment is, it operates on rules as such, not their 
applications separately.  Provisions directed to the executive operate 
at the level of application. 
Reading the First Amendment and other constitutional provisions 
as giving commands to government actors, and so asking who has vio-
lated the command, is quite natural.  But it puts constitutional rules 
into a fundamental legal category in which, I will argue, many of 
them do not belong.  Many constitutional rules, and in particular, the 
rules that govern the legislative authority of Congress, are about pow-
er and not duty.  Strictly speaking, it is not possible to violate them.  
Failure to comply with such a rule produces not a wrong, but a nulli-
ty. 
The First Amendment, other affirmative limits on legislative pow-
er, and the grants of power impose no duties.  The question of facial 
and as-applied invalidity, therefore, cannot be resolved by asking 
about compliance or non-compliance with their commands.  Another 
implication of this conceptual point, perhaps more surprising, is that 
the powers and limitations are not the source of legislators’ obliga-
tions concerning the constitutionality of their legislation.  Those ob-
ligations, I will argue, come from elsewhere in the Constitution and 
are not as absolute as may be thought.  A conscientious legislator 
sometimes can support legislation that is, in the legislator’s view, un-
constitutional and so void. 
While analysis under the category of duty cannot account for rule-
level and application-level invalidity, a reading of the First Amend-
ment’s text that assumes it to be wholly about power can do so.  Ac-
 
 2 See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (discussing 
whether exemptions from generally applicable laws should be granted to religious practi-
tioners). 
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cording to that reading, all rules (though not all statutes) are valid or 
invalid on their face as far as the First Amendment is concerned.  
When a rule is invalid on its face, the question is not exactly whether 
it is severable, but rather whether Congress has explicitly or implicitly 
provided a fallback rule that produces some but not all of the same 
results. 
Part I of this Article elaborates on two basic distinctions.  The first 
is between the manifestations of the principle that unconstitutional 
rules are void.  Sometimes, that principle applies to rules as such, so 
that they are invalid as rules, or on their face.  Sometimes, the princi-
ple applies to some applications of a rule but not others, so that the 
rule is invalid only as applied to some circumstances.  The second dis-
tinction is between rules that deal with legal obligations or duties and 
rules that deal with actors’ capacity to change the legal situation or 
powers.  The remainder of the Article analyzes problems posed by the 
former distinction in light of the latter. 
Part II discusses the bearing on facial and as-applied invalidity of 
the duties that the Constitution imposes on governmental actors.  It 
introduces two more distinctions that categorize constitutional rules.  
The first is between constitutional rules that deal with juridical acts, 
such as legislation and adjudication, and the less common rules that 
deal with physical acts, such as the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions 
on searches and seizures.  Within the category of juridical acts, Part II 
distinguishes between two kinds of rules concerning power.  The first 
kind grants or restricts power, such as legislative power, and are then 
applied by someone else, such as the courts.  The second kind give 
some institution, quintessentially the courts, power to resolve a dis-
pute conclusively, in a way that must be accepted even if it is based on 
legal error. 
With those distinctions in place, Part II addresses the problem of 
facial validity in light of the duties of government decision-makers.  It 
argues, perhaps surprisingly, that in general, the grants and limits of 
federal legislative power, like the Commerce Clause and the First 
Amendment, do not create duties at all.  They grant and restrict pow-
er and do nothing else.  As a result, no argument about facial validity 
that rests on the derivation of duties from such provisions can suc-
ceed.  Legislators do have duties with respect to the constitutionality 
of legislation, I will argue, but those duties arise from other provi-
sions of the Constitution and are qualified, not absolute.  Because 
they are qualified, they also do not support an inference that grants 
and restrictions of power operate at the level of rules. 
Government decision-makers do have absolute duties to apply the 
law honestly when they are applying the law, that is, when they are 
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exercising power conclusively to resolve a dispute.  As a result, courts 
have an absolute obligation to follow the law, as do Senators when 
they sit in impeachment trials.  But most exercises of legislative power 
are not conclusive, and leave to later decision-makers, including 
courts, the question of the constitutionality of legislative rules. 
Some provisions of the Constitution are directed to physical and 
not juridical acts, and pose distinct questions about facial and as-
applied validity.  Part II concludes that provisions like that do limit 
the power of Congress but do not impose duties on Congress.  As lim-
its on power, they operate at the level of application and in general 
do not make legislative rules invalid on their face. 
Part III is specifically about the First Amendment, understood as 
being wholly a restriction on the power of Congress.  It argues that 
the text does support the claim that the First Amendment makes 
rules as such valid or invalid, and does not operate on applications.  
Although that form of invalidity is most consonant with the text, long-
standing practice seems to assume that the Constitution produces 
both facial and as-applied invalidity.  Part III proposes a solution to 
this difficulty based on the general category of which ordinary sever-
ability is one instance:  legislative fallback rules, which replace rules 
or combinations of rules that are invalid at rule level.  The results 
usually described as as-applied invalidity can be understood as facial 
invalidity combined with the identification of a fallback rule.  Facial 
invalidity, by contrast, occurs when a rule is invalid as such and no 
valid replacement is available.  The Article concludes by suggesting 
that this way of thinking about rule-level invalidity can better explain 
the situations in which it appears and can enhance the standard ex-
planations for its appearance. 
I.  RULES AND APPLICATIONS, POWER AND DUTY 
A.  Rules and Applications 
Legal rules are generalizations, identifying the situations in which 
they apply and prescribing some legal consequence of the occurrence 
of those situations.  An import duty identifies acts of importation of 
certain goods and attaches to those acts an obligation to pay the duty.  
A criminal law identifies conduct and makes it a crime.  Rules thus 
govern, but are distinct from, their applications.  Rules are also dis-
tinct from the enactments that create them.  A single act of Congress 
may contain hundreds or thousands of rules, with each rule applying 
to a large number of possible occurrences. 
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Under the Constitution, the federal government’s power to make 
and alter legal rules has limits.  Probably the most fundamental limit 
comes from the principle that federal power exists only when the 
Constitution grants it.  Hence, the absence of a grant of power pro-
duces a limitation.  The Constitution also imposes affirmative limita-
tions on powers that the federal government otherwise would have 
but for the limitation in question.  For example, Congress has the 
power to levy taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.3  If the clause 
stopped there, Congress could impose a duty of one percent ad val-
orem on oil imports that arrive east of the Mississippi River and two 
percent on those that arrive west of the river.  But duties, imposts, 
and excises must be uniform throughout the United States.4  The ge-
ographically varying duty would be unconstitutional. 
A geographically varying duty would be unconstitutional even 
though there is nothing impermissible about a one- or two-percent 
tax on oil imports as such.  A tax at either level, if applied uniformly, 
would be within Congress’s power.  The non-uniform duty is thus an 
example of a legal rule that is unconstitutional at the rule level.  Non-
uniformity is a feature of the generalization, not of any one of its ap-
plications; it arises only when the applications are compared to one 
another.  In order to know whether any application is permissible, it 
is necessary to know the content of the rule that produced it.  Not on-
ly is such a tax unconstitutional at the rule level, it is unconstitutional 
only at the rule level.  Any of its applications could be produced by a 
different rule that was constitutional. 
Rule-level invalidity is not the only form of unconstitutionality for 
federal enactments.  Some applications are contrary to the Constitu-
tion without regard to the rule that produces them.  Congress may 
not tax exports.5  No federal tax may be applied to a transaction that 
constitutes an export, no matter what rule calls for the imposition of 
the tax.  The ban applies both to a rule that taxes only exports and 
one that taxes all exchanges of some named commodity, including, 
but not limited to, exports.  Unlike the non-uniform import duty, a 
duty on all transactions could constitutionally be applied to some of 
its applications, those that taxed imports. 
 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States . . . .”). 
 4 Id. (“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States . . . .”). 
 5 Id. art. I, § 9 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”). 
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Whether any particular constitutional provision produces rule-
level or application-level unconstitutionality can be a matter of con-
siderable importance.  One leading example involves the Free Exer-
cise Clause and the problem of religious exemptions from generally 
applicable statutes.  Under Sherbert v. Verner, any time a statutory rule 
burdened the exercise of religion, the burden had to be strongly jus-
tified.6  In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 
the Court took another approach, finding that general and neutral 
rules could apply when they had the effect of burdening religious ex-
ercise, with or without a strong justification.7  According to the for-
mer case, the Free Exercise Clause produced application-level uncon-
stitutionality but would make an entire rule unconstitutional only if 
all of its applications were separately inconsistent with the clause.  
Under Smith, by contrast, general and neutral rules are not subject to 
application-level review, but rules that single out religious exercise 
are unconstitutional as such. 
Professor Nicholas Rosenkranz has recently presented an innova-
tive and powerful approach to the Constitution’s text that is designed 
to determine which constitutional provisions operate at rule level and 
which operate at application level.8  According to Rosenkranz, the 
crucial move is to identify the government actor to whom the provi-
sion is addressed.9  Sometimes, that will be obvious because the ad-
dressee will be the subject of the normative sentence, as Congress is 
the subject of the First Amendment.10  When the Constitution speaks 
in the passive voice, however, it is necessary to infer the addressee.11 
According to Professor Rosenkranz, only provisions addressed to 
Congress affect the validity of legislation, and those provisions all 
 
 6 374 U.S. 398, 406–08 (1963) (noting that only a compelling state interest justifies substan-
tial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment rights and recognizing that where a 
statute burdening religious rights was upheld, there was a countervailing strong state in-
terest). 
 7 494 U.S. at 885–89 (holding that a general law that is not directed against religion may 
regulate an act of religious exercise without regard to whether the government’s interest 
in the law is compelling). 
 8 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz’s article titled The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1209 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Subjects], was followed by his companion article ti-
tled The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005 (2011) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, 
Objects], both exploring these issues. 
 9 Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 8, at 1214 (“Thus, a constitutional claim is necessarily a 
claim that some actor has acted inconsistently with the Constitution.”). 
 10 Id. at 1235 (noting that the First Amendment’s explicit subject is Congress). 
 11 The clauses that speak in the passive voice “are easy to identify,” but “the actors to whom 
they apply are not.”  Rosenkranz, Objects, supra note 8, at 1011. 
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produce only rule-level invalidity.12  Those provisions impose duties 
on the legislature that must be complied with in the act of legislation, 
and the act of legislation necessarily involves decisions about rules as 
such in advance of any application.  Because Congress must be able 
to comply with its duties, it must be possible to determine at the time 
of legislation whether the duty has been complied with.13  The First 
Amendment, Professor Rosenkranz’s leading example, imposes a du-
ty on Congress.  It produces rule-level—also known as facial—
invalidity, and only rule-level invalidity.14 
Application is the job of the executive, so application-level invalid-
ity arises when, and only when, the executive violates a duty imposed 
on it.  Unlike legislation, executive application takes place after rules 
are made and is retail, not wholesale.  On this score, Professor 
Rosenkranz offers the Fourth Amendment as a paradigmatic case.  It 
forbids unreasonable searches and seizures; searches and seizures are 
undertaken by executive officers, so the Fourth Amendment applies 
to the executive.15  Like other rules governing the executive, it oper-
ates one instance at a time.16  The Fourth Amendment and similar 
provisions are not addressed to and do not limit Congress, so they do 
not make statutory rules invalid either as rules or as applied.  In as-
sessing an arguably unreasonable search or seizure, any statute that 
purports to authorize it is not unconstitutional but simply irrelevant.17 
Professor Rosenkranz categorizes constitutional rules by their ad-
dressee and understands the Constitution to impose obligations on 
those it addresses.  His argument in support of rule-level invalidity re-
 
 12 Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 8, at 1235–38 (“If Congress has violated the Constitution 
by making an impermissible law, then it has violated the Constitution at the moment of 
making the law.”). 
 13 Id. at 1238 (“But if Congressmen are to be charged with the profound responsibility to 
support the Constitution, it must be that constitutional tests applicable to legislative ac-
tion are ones that conscientious congressmen could theoretically apply.  And so, if Con-
gress is the subject, then the appropriate doctrinal test must be one whose inputs are 
available at the moment of enactment, on the face of the statute.”). 
 14 Id. at 1235–37 (explaining that violation of the First Amendment occurs at the moment 
that Congress enacts a statute and that a violation is visible on the face of the statute). 
 15 Id. at 1241 (“It is the President who violates the [search and seizure] clause of the Fourth 
Amendment, by executing an unreasonable search.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 16 Id. (“[T]he [Fourth Amendment] litigation will very much turn on the defendant’s spe-
cific facts—what exactly was searched, and when, and where.  Here the enforcement facts 
do not postdate the constitutional violation; here the enforcement facts are the constitu-
tional violation.”); id. (“[A] constitutional claim under the first clause of the Fourth 
Amendment is never a ‘facial’ challenge, because it is always and inherently a challenge 
to executive action.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 17 Id. at 1240 (“The act of Congress did not violate the Fourth Amendment; the act of the 
President did.”). 
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lies on a standard principle of the logic of obligation:  ought implies 
can.  Obligations assume a capacity to comply with them.  Congress 
must be able to comply with the command of the First Amendment.  
For Congress to be able to comply with it, that command must pro-
vide guidance about the decisions Congress makes.  Those decisions 
are about rules and not applications separately.  Although Professor 
Rosenkranz regards constitutional provisions as imposing duties on 
their addressees, he also regards those provisions that apply to Con-
gress as determining which purported acts of legislation are genuine-
ly effective and which are void.  His argument thus moves from duties 
to powers, and so combines two fundamentally distinct legal concep-
tions.  The distinction between power and duty is basic to the Consti-
tution and to the argument I will present. 
B.  Power and Duty 
Legal rules, frequently, are imperatives.  They identify possible 
conduct as forbidden, required, or permitted.  Criminal law, for ex-
ample, mainly imposes prohibitions.  Rules of that kind impose du-
ties, and someone who violates such a duty is a wrongdoer.  Violations 
of duties generally give rise to some consequence, such as criminal 
punishment or a civil remedy, such as damages. 
Analytical jurisprudence identifies four characteristic positions 
that a person may occupy with respect to a rule of this kind.18  Per-
haps the most fundamental is that of a potential actor who is obliged 
to comply with the rule.  That person has a duty.19  The position op-
posed to a duty, that a potential actor may have is usually called liber-
ty or privilege.  Someone who has no duty with respect to a possible 
action, but may decide whether to engage in it or not, has a liberty or 
privilege so to act.20 
Although duties are very important, private law in particular is of-
ten concerned with another characteristic position, that of the person 
who may be acted upon.  A leading example is the position of a 
 
 18 For the classic exposition of the concepts and their relationships, see generally Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE 
L.J. 710 (1917), and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Ap-
plied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
 19 Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163, 165 (1919) (“If we de-
termine that A must conduct himself in a certain manner he has a duty to B, and B has a 
right against A.”).  Corbin undertook to make Hohfeld’s work more accessible shortly af-
ter Hohfeld died, at a comparatively early age, in 1918. 
 20 Id. (“If we determine that A may conduct himself in a certain way he has a privilege with 
respect to B, and B has no-right that A shall not so conduct himself.”). 
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property owner with respect to a potential act of trespass.  Others are 
forbidden to trespass and have a duty in that respect.  The owner has 
the position that is said to correlate with the others’ duty, called a 
right or, in more technical usage, a claim-right.21  Completing the 
symmetry is the position of someone to whom no duty runs with re-
spect to another’s possible conduct.  Such a person has no right, or a 
no-right.22  No-rights correlate with liberties or privileges and are the 
opposite of rights. 
Imperatives do not exhaust the universe of legal rules.  Another 
kind of rule gives rise to another set of four characteristic positions.  
This second set is about capacities to alter existing legal arrange-
ments.23  Contractual capacity, which can be used to create duties and 
rights that did not exist before, operates with respect to this second 
kind of rule.  The ability to produce such a change, for example by 
making a contract, is called a power.24  As with the first category, there 
are two positions described from the standpoint of a potential actor, 
here a potential arrangement-changer:  power and disability.25  A mi-
nor whose contractual capacity is limited has substantial disability 
concerning contracts that an adult may enter into. 
Again, there are two positions described from the standpoint of 
one who may be acted upon.  Those two are opposed to one another 
and each correlates with a position described from the standpoint of 
one who may act.  Someone whose positions are subject to change by 
another has a liability that correlates with the relevant power.26  (A li-
ability is not necessarily a bad thing; the capacity to receive a bequest 
is a liability to the operation of a testamentary power.)27  If one per-
son has no power to change some legal position of another’s, then 
the person whose legal position is not subject to alteration has an 
 
 21 Id. at 167 (“Right [is defined as] . . . [a]n enforceable claim to performance (action or 
forbearance) by another.”). 
 22 Id. at 168 (“No-right [is defined as] . . . [t]he legal relation of a person (A) in whose be-
half society commands nothing of another (B) . . . .”). 
 23 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 130 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (“Duties and their opposite, liberties, describe positions with respect to ultimate 
conduct.  Powers commonly are exercised antecedently, so as to create, abolish, or modify 
duties and liberties or other powers.”). 
 24 Corbin, supra note 19, at 168 (“Power [is defined as] . . . [t]he legal relation of A to B 
when A’s own voluntary act will cause new legal relations either between B and A or be-
tween B and a third person.”). 
 25 Id. at 170 (“Disability [is defined as] . . . [t]he relation of A to B when by no voluntary act 
of his own can A extinguish one (or more) of the existing legal relations of B.”). 
 26 Id. at 169 (“Liability [is defined as] . . . [t]he relation of A to B when A may be brought 
into new legal relations by the voluntary act of B.”). 
 27 Id. (“[L]iabilities are not always disadvantageous to the possessor . . . .”). 
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immunity from change by that other person with respect to that posi-
tion.28 
The consequence of non-compliance with the first kind of rule, as 
noted, is mainly a matter of the law of remedies, broadly under-
stood.29  All that the rules about duty say is that the violation of a duty 
is a wrong.30  Non-compliance with the second kind of rule is different 
in both its substance and the applicable terminology.  If someone 
who lacks the power to grant an item of property purports to make 
the grant, nothing happens.  The supposed grant is a nullity, a legally 
void undertaking.31  The second kind of rule provides criteria by 
which to judge the validity of attempted legal acts; acts that fail those 
criteria are ineffective to change legal positions. 
Rules about power thus might be said to have their remedy built 
in, except that the term remedy is inapposite.  A remedy is designed 
to undo, prevent, or otherwise respond to a wrong.32  But an attempt-
ed exercise of power that is ineffective is not, in general, a wrong be-
cause it is not a breach of duty.33  A sixteen-year-old who misunder-
stands the legal capacities of minors and unknowingly makes a void 
contract usually has done nothing wrong and is not subject to any 
remedy or sanction.  Nevertheless, the contract is void.  For the same 
reason, it is misleading to say that rules about power are violated 
when they are not complied with.  Someone who desires to make a 
will, but accidentally picks up and signs a document that is not a will, 
has not complied with the law of wills in some jurisdictions, but can 
 
 28 Id. at 170 (“Immunity [is defined as] . . . [t]he relation of A to B when B has no legal 
power (has disability) to affect some one or more of the existing legal relations of A.”). 
 29 See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 137–38 (noting that the law of remedies governs 
consequences of violations of primary duties). 
 30 See, e.g., id. at 130 (“A private duty is an authoritatively recognized obligation of a private 
person not to do something . . . .”); id. at 136 (distinguishing between the content of ob-
ligations and the consequences of violating them, and noting that primary rights, the cor-
relative of duties, must not be confused with remedial rights of action). 
 31 See id. at 134 (“Power law, it will be seen increasingly, presents distinctive remedial prob-
lems.  The characteristic sanction of an empowering arrangement is the sanction of nulli-
ty.”). 
 32 See id. at 136 (arguing against the confusion between primary duties and the remedies for 
violating those duties, maintaining instead that the law of remedies must be understood 
in light of the law of primary obligations, and not vice versa); see also id. (noting that the 
point of sanctions is to bring about compliance with primary obligations). 
 33 Id. at 133 (“Generally speaking, however, people who have private powers have a liberty 
to exercise them or not as they see fit.”).  However, some purported legal acts are both 
void and wrongful.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-38.1 (2013) (prohibiting certain types of 
marriages, including bigamous marriages); id. § 20-40 (enacting punishments for persons 
entering into a prohibited marriage); id. § 20-45.1 (making a prohibited marriage void).  
Therefore, under the law of Virginia, people who are married have a duty not to purport 
to marry again and a disability from actually doing so. 
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be said to have violated that law only in a strained sense.34  Such a 
person clearly has not committed a wrong. 
The two kinds of legal rules can be combined.  Of considerable 
importance in this Article is the fact that there can be duties with re-
spect to the exercise of powers.  A contract for the sale of real estate 
creates a duty for the seller to exercise the power to transfer the real 
estate to the buyer.  Failure to do so is a wrong and may give rise to a 
remedy, including specific performance.35  The fact that the duty may 
be breached demonstrates that it is distinct from the power to which 
it applies; if the contract of sale by itself effected the transfer, no 
remedy would be necessary. 
Contracts of sale create affirmative duties to exercise powers.  
Perhaps surprising is the fact that a party may be subject to a prohibi-
tion with respect to the exercise of a power, a prohibition that does 
not invalidate the exercise.  A standard example is an agent with ap-
parent authority who has private instructions from the principal.  If 
the agent exercises that authority contrary to the instructions, say by 
selling an asset below the minimum price set confidentially by the 
principal, the sale generally will be valid, and the principal will be 
bound to the buyer.36  The agent will have committed a wrong, and 
the principal usually will be entitled to a remedy against the agent.37  
An exercise of power thus can be both valid and wrongful. 
The analytical categories can be used to describe the positions of 
official as well as private actors.38  When Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution begins, “Congress shall have power,”39 the ordinary and 
analytical usages converge:  Congress is thereby given the capacity to 
 
 34 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-403 (2013) (requiring that wills must be signed); id. § 64.2-
404 (relaxing some formalities, but not the requirement of a signature, when the propo-
nent of a will proves by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended to 
make a will). 
 35 See 3 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS’ LAW OF REMEDIES 299–300 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that specific 
performance is generally available for breach of contract to convey real estate). 
 36 See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 182–83 (3d ed. 2001) 
(claiming that a principal is bound when an agent with apparent authority enters into an 
agreement in violation of secret instructions from the principal). 
 37 See id. at 146 (discussing the remedies available to a principal when an agent sells or de-
stroys property against the instructions of the principal); id. at 144 (“It is not at all incon-
sistent for an agent to be clothed with a certain power, but, at the same time to be under 
instructions and thus under a duty to his principal that he shall not use the power in a 
particular proscribed way.”). 
 38 HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 135 (stressing that Hohfeld’s work was designed mainly 
to express the positions of private people with respect to one another, and maintaining 
that the position of immunity was of little importance as between private people but of 
great importance with respect to the relations between private people and official actors). 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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alter the legal rules that determine others’ positions.  By passing a law 
forbidding the counterfeiting of federal securities, for example, Con-
gress can create a duty that did not exist before.  The Constitution al-
so contains duties, such as the President’s obligation to take care that 
the laws are faithfully executed.40 
Central to American constitutional law is the principle that consti-
tutional rules about power, like private-law rules about power, pro-
vide criteria for the validity of purported changes in the law.  In gen-
eral, an act of Congress that is contrary to the Constitution’s rules 
about congressional power is legally ineffective.  That principle is a 
necessary condition for judicial review as practiced in this country, 
and the Supreme Court relied on it in Marbury v. Madison.41  That is 
not the only possible arrangement.  The Constitution could make 
acts of Congress valid whether or not they comply with it, while im-
posing on legislators a duty to ensure compliance.42  That duty would 
be enforced by some sanction, including political sanctions by the 
voters or legal sanctions such as impeachment of the President for 
signing unconstitutional legislation. 
Judicial review as usually practiced does not seek to enforce any 
duties that legislators may bear concerning the constitutionality of 
their enactments.  Rather, it operates by treating unconstitutional 
enactments as legal nullities, like purported contracts made by peo-
ple who lack contractual capacity.  That does not rule out the possi-
bility that legislators also have duties with respect to those powers, but 
it does underline the point that Marbury-style judicial review does not 
depend on the existence of such duties. 
Professor Rosenkranz’s argument concerning facial and as-applied 
invalidity, however, does depend on the claim that the Constitution 
imposes duties on its addressees and that the nature of those duties 
has important implications for the question of rule-level and applica-
tion-level invalidity.  The next Part of this Article takes up the ques-
tion of official duties and their implications for that question. 
 
 40 Id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully execut-
ed . . . .”). 
 41 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803) (noting that the Constitution 
defines and limits the power of the legislature and grants the Supreme Court the power 
to review the validity of congressional actions). 
 42 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466–67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(maintaining that the Constitution did provide for judicial review of acts of Congress, re-
jecting the possibility that the legislature would be the final judge of the constitutionality 
of its enactments).  As discussed below, such a power could be combined with a duty to 
exercise it in good faith. 
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II.  CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES AND RULE-LEVEL INVALIDITY 
Discussions of the Constitution routinely mix the vocabularies of 
power and duty.  The principle that unconstitutional statutes are nul-
lities is a principle older than Marbury, and Professor Rosenkranz is 
joined by the Supreme Court in referring to violations of the Consti-
tution.43  This Part discusses the relevance of constitutional duties to 
the problem of rule-level and application-level invalidity. 
As the exposition of the analytical categories above suggests, du-
ties are especially common with respect to physical actions, like tres-
pass.  Rules about power, by contrast, are wholly about juridical acts, 
like making a contract.44  The main question here concerns putative 
duties with respect to the exercise of powers, or the purported exer-
cise of powers, which is to say, with respect to juridical acts.  The Con-
stitution, to some extent, does, however, concern itself with physical 
acts.  The contrast between the two appears from two constitutional 
provisions that often provide examples in this context, the First and 
Fourth Amendments.  The former is concerned with Congress’s ac-
tions in the legal realm, while the latter is partly concerned with en-
forcement officers’ physical acts such as entering a dwelling.  Because 
the distinction between juridical and physical acts is salient with re-
spect to the distinction between powers and duties, this Part will ad-
dress separately those constitutional provisions that apply only to 
purported exercises of power and those that apply to physical actions. 
A.  Power, Duty, and Official Acts That Change Legal Relations 
The Constitution is overwhelmingly concerned with granting and 
limiting power, and constitutional doctrine is very largely concerned 
with provisions that grant legislative power to Congress and those that 
limit congressional power, such as the First Amendment.  Just as Arti-
cle I begins by vesting legislative power in Congress, Article III begins 
by vesting the judicial power of the United States in the federal 
courts.  Both legislative and judicial power can change legal relations.  
Congress can make previously innocent conduct criminal, and a 
 
 43 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 
(2010) (holding that statutory provisions governing Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board, taken together, “produce a constitutional violation”). 
 44 The word “juridical” is somewhat ungainly, but “legal” has a confusing connotation.  A 
“legal” act implies that the act in question is lawful, as opposed to being concerned with 
the physical world.  Juridical acts are accomplished with physical acts, such as signing a 
will or saying, “I accept,” but the two are distinct.  Many physical acts have no conse-
quences for legal positions. 
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court can enter an injunction that similarly makes previously permis-
sible conduct the crime of contempt. 
Legislative and judicial powers are not parallel, however, in one 
respect that is crucial here.  Legislation that is beyond enumerated 
federal power or contrary to an affirmative restriction thereon is, in 
general, invalid.  The courts’ judgments, by contrast, are binding 
even when they rest on error concerning the applicable law, includ-
ing the Constitution.  If one thinks of Congress as making constitu-
tional judgments when it legislates, those judgments are thus far less 
binding than the courts’ determinations on similar questions. 
In this respect, the grants of legislative and judicial power differ in 
the way in which they identify legally effective exercises of the power 
involved.  To be valid, a purported exercise of legislative power must 
meet two conditions.  First, it must come from the individuals who 
constitute the legislature.  Second, an act of the lawful legislators 
must also conform to the constitutional provisions granting and limit-
ing power.  Because of the second criterion, validity depends on sub-
stance.  Whether a purported judgment of a court is binding, howev-
er, depends only on whether the individuals claiming to issue the 
judgment are indeed judges.  If they are, then within broad limits, 
their determinations are binding without regard to those determina-
tions’ substantive conformity with the legal rules on which they are 
based.  Courts are final in a way in which legislatures are not. 
That point about different kinds of government power, I will ar-
gue, has important implications for the duties that different govern-
ment officials have with respect to the Constitution.  Those different 
duties, in turn, have implications for the question of rule-level and 
application-level validity.  The duties of legislatures, which I will sug-
gest do not come from the relevant substantive provisions like the 
First Amendment, are not such as to imply that legislative rules are 
either valid or invalid as such.  This Part of the Article deals first with 
the duties of legislators concerning the constitutionality of legislation 
and then discusses the contrasting duties of officials whose decisions 
are final. 
1.  Exercises of Legislative Power 
To say that Congress violates the Constitution when it adopts an 
unconstitutional statutory rule can simply be a way of saying that the 
rule is void because it is inconsistent with superior law.  But violation 
is more commonly used to describe an act inconsistent with an obli-
gation or a duty.  Professor Rosenkranz, in identifying Congress as 
the wrongdoer and deducing consequences from that identification, 
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relies on the constitutional duties of legislators with respect to legisla-
tion.45  I will argue that while such duties exist, their source is not in 
the power-granting or power-limiting provisions and that their con-
tent is flexible.  Legislators do not have an absolute obligation to vote 
against legislation because it is unconstitutional.  The non-absolute 
nature of their duty counts against the argument that invalidity must 
be at rule level. 
The first step, perhaps shocking, is the argument that the Consti-
tution’s rules about the power of Congress do not impose duties at 
all. 
a.  The First Amendment and Other Provisions Governing 
Congressional Authority 
The First Amendment very likely limits the power of Congress 
without imposing any duties.  Even if the First Amendment does im-
pose duties, the system of federal power in the main does not.  In 
particular, the principle that federal legislative power is enumerated 
limits Congress’s ability to change legal relations but does not create 
duties. 
The First Amendment is an imperative:  “Congress shall make no 
law,” it begins.46  It is readily interpreted as a command.  Commands 
create duties, if the person giving the command has the power to do 
so.  And if the Constitution speaks as it purports to, in the name of 
the sovereign people, it can impose any duty on their agents that the 
people wish. 
The people can indeed do that, but as the sovereign, they can do 
even more.  They can issue a performative, a statement that makes it-
self true because of the authority of the person who utters it.  Article 
I’s Vesting Clause works like that.47  When it says that legislative power 
shall be vested, it is not ordering Congress to give itself power, it is 
giving power.  And when the First Amendment says that Congress 
shall make no law, it can mean, Congress is hereby made incapable of 
creating a legal rule.  If that is what it means, then Congress indeed 
can make no law of that description.  It may pass a statute, but the 
statute will be void and hence, in a sense, no law will be made. 
 
 45 See e.g., Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 8, at 1221 (identifying Congress as the “culprit” 
when an unconstitutional statute is passed). 
 46 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 47 Id. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
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That the First Amendment at least limits power in this fashion is 
well established.  One reason that it is so well established is the paral-
lel between the First Amendment, which concerns the laws Congress 
makes, and the affirmative grants of power, which do the same.  One 
very prominent grant by its terms enables Congress to “make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper” to achieve the end it sets out.48  
When the Constitution says that Congress may make certain laws, it 
gives power.  The natural inference is that when it says that Congress 
may not make certain laws, it limits power. 
More difficult is the question whether the First Amendment also 
imposes a duty on Congress not to pass statutes that are inconsistent 
with it and so, to some extent, ineffective in creating new legal rules.  
It may, but I think that it does not.  To limit power and impose a du-
ty, it would have to use the word “law” in two distinct senses, one 
meaning valid legal enactment, the other meaning invalid statutory 
rule.  Both can indeed be called a law, but using both senses at once 
takes economy to an extreme.  The reading according to which “law” 
means valid law also has the virtue of making the First Amendment 
parallel with the grants of power.  Unlike the First Amendment, they 
have a grammatical form that cannot be taken as a command to Con-
gress.  They simply give authority.  If the First Amendment is their 
opposite, it too is only about power. 
Text coincides with analysis here.  The power-granting provisions 
produce nullity for purported acts of legislation beyond their scope.  
They have no words that explicitly suggest duty, as the First Amend-
ment does.  Any duty that they produce is implied.  But if they do in-
clude a duty, it is a quite fine-grained one.  It would not be correctly 
expressed by saying that Congress is obliged not to legislate beyond 
the enumeration; Congress is unable to do that and can only seem to 
do that by passing a statute that is, to some extent, ineffective.  If 
there is a duty, it is an obligation not to pass statutes that enact inop-
erative rules that are inoperative because they are beyond enumerat-
ed power.  Duties of that form do exist; acts by officials that are under 
color of law but void can be wrongful.49  It takes careful drafting to 
 
 48 Id. art I, § 8 (“[Congress shall have power] [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested 
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Of-
ficer thereof.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing private civil relief for 
acts under color of law).  The distinction between acts under color of law, which general-
ly will be done by public officials acting in excess of their official power and privilege, and 
genuinely authorized official acts, is the solution to the supposed paradox exemplified in 
Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).  The paradox 
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accomplish that goal, however.  A duty not to make rules that are un-
constitutional and legally effective would never be violated because 
the legislature cannot do that.  Rational constitution-makers who 
wanted to convey the subtle message concerning acts under color of 
law but nevertheless void would do so explicitly. 
Even if the First Amendment is not only about power, the grants 
mean that there are limits on congressional power with no accompa-
nying duty.50  One way or another, then, the Constitution, to a large 
extent, limits congressional power without imposing any duty not to 
attempt to exercise the authority that the legislature does not have.  
That feature of the system has important consequences.  For one 
thing, it counts against Professor Rosenkranz’s argument concerning 
facial invalidity.  That argument relies on a congressional duty with 
respect to the powers of Congress.  As indicated, I do not think that 
the provisions concerning powers create such duties, and in any 
event, at least some of them do not. 
Insofar as the constitutional rules governing Congress’s powers 
are only about power in the analytical sense and not about duty, the 
inference they support is substantially weaker than the one on which 
Professor Rosenkranz relies.  If the provisions about power impose 
duties, then the logic of normative reasoning requires that Congress 
know whether it is complying with them at the time of enactment.  By 
contrast, although Congress has reason to know about the extent of 
its powers, that reason is not so absolute.  A legislature that knows, at 
the time of enactment, whether its statutes will be treated as valid, can 
do its job more effectively.  But legislatures inevitably face uncertainty 
about the effect of their work, including uncertainty about how their 
enactments will interact with one another.  Constitutional uncertainty 
based on possible invalidity at the time and level of application is just 
one more form of uncertainty, and it is entirely possible that the Con-
 
poses the question, how can an act be both official, and so subject to a prohibition that 
applies only to government actors, and unlawful because unauthorized and so not the of-
ficial act of the government?  Id. at 287.  The answer is the category of acts under color of 
law, which are neither wholly private nor actually authorized. 
 50 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”).  Although it is not a grant of power with an implicit non-grant and accompany-
ing limitation, but explicitly states a limit, the limit that it explicitly states is the one that 
results from non-grants of power.  It is not like the First Amendment, which is in the form 
of an imperative.  The Tenth Amendment thus cannot be read as an explicit directive to 
Congress not to exercise powers not granted to it.  As a statement that ungranted powers 
are not available, it makes explicit statements about power, not duty. 
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stitution accepts it as the price of protecting liberty when laws are ap-
plied. 
This implication of my argument may seem minor compared to 
another consequence, which indeed may seem to be a reductio ad 
absurdum.  From the First Congress to this day, Senators and Repre-
sentatives have been deeply concerned with the constitutionality of 
their acts.  That concern has not been just practical; they routinely 
discuss a felt obligation not to legislate in a manner inconsistent with 
the Constitution.51  Whether Presidents are similarly bound when 
they sign or veto legislation is a matter of dispute, but the position 
that they are is both venerable and very much alive today.52  Yet if I 
am right, the substantive provisions that grant and limit power usual-
ly, and perhaps always, impose no such duty.  One might well think 
this consequence unacceptable, and an argument that produces it 
hence wrong. 
But my reading of the provisions that govern congressional power, 
such as the First Amendment and Article I, Section 8, implies only 
that those provisions impose no duty on Congress.  Congress may 
have duties that arise from other provisions that relate to the consti-
tutionality of its legislation.  I think that it does, but that those duties 
do not absolutely forbid a conscientious Senator or Representative 
 
 51 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS 1829–1861, 
at 192–94 (2005) (containing many examples of congressional debates on the constitu-
tionality of proposed legislation, debates premised on the assumption that unconstitu-
tional legislation should not be adopted).  As Currie notes, the terms in which Congress 
discussed an issue were often the same terms in which the courts would later assess the 
same question.  For example, when Congress discussed its power to legitimate the Wheel-
ing Bridge, which obstructed navigation on the Ohio River, it presaged the arguments 
that the Justices would use when a divided Court upheld the statute.  Id.  Before the stat-
ute was adopted, the Court had held that the Wheeling Bridge was an unlawful obstruc-
tion of interstate commerce in Wheeling Bridge I.  Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Co. (Wheeling Bridge I), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 537 (1852).  The Court sustained 
the legislation legitimating the bridge in Wheeling Bridge II, finding that it was no longer 
an unlawful obstruction.  Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling 
Bridge II), 59 (18 How.) U.S. 421, 432 (1856). 
 52 Presidents have been criticized for signing bills that contain provisions that they believe 
to be unconstitutional while saying that the executive will not carry out the unconstitu-
tional parts.  E.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 90 (2007) (explaining how Presidents have been criticized 
for signing bills that contain provisions that they believe to be unconstitutional while say-
ing that the executive will not carry out the unconstitutional parts).  But see Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 113, 115–16 (2007) (explaining that the practice of signing bills that the President be-
lieves to be unconstitutional has defenders); William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 
86 IND. L.J. 303, 307–08 (2011) (arguing that signing unconstitutional laws is justified on 
practical, not formalistic, grounds). 
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from voting for legislation that is beyond the power of Congress in 
that member’s judgment.  I will turn now to the source and content 
of those duties of legislators concerning legislation. 
b.  The Duties of Members of Congress to the Constitution 
This Part sketches an account of the duties that members of Con-
gress bear with respect to the constitutionality of their enactments.  
Although the topic is of profound importance, and although the ex-
istence of some such duties is taken almost for granted, the question 
has received surprisingly little careful attention from scholars.53  Be-
cause the territory is so unfamiliar, my argument here is necessarily 
tentative. 
The Article VI oath requires that Senators and Representatives 
promise to support the Constitution.54  But identifying the oath’s 
meaning takes some thought.  The Constitution itself sets out quite 
broad purposes, such as providing for the common defense.55  Sup-
porting the Constitution, however, does not entail military service.  
Indeed, members of Congress are not allowed to hold any federal of-
fice, and that bar is not limited to civilian public service.56  Support 
must consist of something more specific than helping out with the 
document’s broad purposes. 
Article VI itself provides the central example, and so makes possi-
ble reasoning by analogy.  It makes federal law hierarchically su-
preme relative to state law and binds the judges in every state to re-
spect that supremacy by following federal law when it conflicts with 
state law.57  The Supremacy Clause assumes that the function of judg-
es is to decide cases in accordance with law, and hence that they need 
to identify the law applicable to those cases.  Because it is so much 
 
 53 William Baude’s article concerning the veto is an exception.  See Baude, supra note 52, at 
310 (giving a similar analysis of the President’s obligations in that they center on the Pres-
ident’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and to preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution, without having to deal with the duties of legislators, who take an 
oath that differs from the President’s and have no role in the execution of the laws). 
 54 U.S. CONST. art. VI (explaining the promise that is required of members of Congress to 
support the Constitution). 
 55 Id. pmbl. (explaining that the Constitution was ordained and established to “provide for 
the common defence”). 
 56 Id. art. I, § 6 (stating that no person holding any office under the United States may be a 
Senator or Representative). 
 57 Id. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contra-
ry notwithstanding.”). 
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about the power of government, the Constitution provides criteria by 
which to decide whether a purported legal rule is valid or not.  It 
thereby, to some extent, tells judges how to perform their official 
function.  For judges, then, to support the Constitution is to accept 
the document’s prescriptions for the performance of their official 
function. 
The Supremacy Clause is targeted specifically at state judges 
(though it applies to most federal judges too), whose judicial office 
and obligation to perform that office derive from state law.58  The of-
ficial duties of federal officials derive from federal law, including the 
Constitution itself.  For an official, an oath to support the Constitu-
tion entails an obligation to perform the functions of the office 
properly.  Senators and Representatives thus have the obligations that 
automatically come with legislative office along with any other obliga-
tions that the Constitution attaches to that office.  By promising to 
support the Constitution, they accept those obligations.  That fact by 
itself does not say what those obligations are.  They are different from 
those of judges, for example, because Senators and Representatives 
generally do not perform the judicial function of conclusively apply-
ing to parties legal rules that primarily bind those parties and not the 
courts themselves.59 
While Senators and Representatives must, of course, comply with 
any duties that the Constitution imposes on them, if I am correct, the 
rules about congressional power do not, in general, create duties.  
For that reason, an account of federal legislators’ duties with respect 
to those power-granting and power-limiting rules must come not di-
rectly from those rules themselves, but from the other possible 
source, the nature of the legislative office as the Constitution estab-
lishes it.  Legislators do not implement the law, and so they do not 
have the duty of judges, to apply the proper legal rules, or of execu-
tive officers, to perform the implementation functions assigned to 
them by those rules.  Legislators make law, and exercise broad discre-
tion in doing so.  They are chosen to do that because the voters have 
confidence in the principles that will guide that discretion.  The im-
plication borders on a commonplace:  the job of legislators is to make 
 
 58 Id. art. VI (explaining that Article VI addresses the judges “in every state”).  Although 
most federal judges exercise their office in a state, not all do.  Now that circuit riding is so 
rare, the Justices of the Supreme Court generally do not.  This is not to say that the Jus-
tices are not bound to prefer the Constitution to state law.  State judges are mentioned 
because they, unlike the Justices, have obligations as officers under state law, obligations 
that are trumped by the Supremacy Clause when they conflict with federal law. 
 59 See id. (explaining that Senators perform a function of that kind when they try an im-
peachment and operate under a special oath when they do). 
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good laws.  In doing so, of course, any one legislator will be called on 
to make compromises, because others will have different principles 
and different judgments about how to implement those principles. 
Most of the time, that means that a legislator’s function is simply 
to exercise good-faith judgment about the public interest as the legis-
lator sees it.  That obligation is quite subjective.  The Constitution it-
self, however, may well supply a more objectively defined goal.  It 
provides criteria by which to judge the validity of sub-constitutional 
legal rules, and obliges judges (if no other officials) to follow those 
criteria and, if necessary, to disregard purported sub-constitutional 
rules.  It is set up to keep unconstitutional enactments from being 
implemented as if they were valid.  When an unconstitutional enact-
ment nevertheless is implemented, something has gone wrong. 
A conscientious legislator should count such an occurrence as a 
bad consequence, one to be avoided, all other things being equal.  
That does not imply, however, that a legislator has an absolute obliga-
tion to seek to prevent that consequence.  On the contrary, the same 
reasoning that leads to that obligation implies that legislators count it 
as a cost to be weighed against benefits.  Just as the Constitution is de-
signed to prevent the implementation of unconstitutional rules, it 
does not take all possible steps to prevent that result.  It puts deci-
sions in the hands of fallible human beings confronting often diffi-
cult questions.  Judges and other implementing officials make mis-
takes, and the Constitution does not tell them always to err on the 
side of finding unconstitutionality.  It accepts errors in the opposite 
direction, in which an unconstitutional rule is implemented.  So does 
the position according to which legislators too have an absolute obli-
gation not to enact unconstitutional rules.  Even if that obligation is 
absolute, it will be carried out by legislators who make mistakes, and 
sometimes will err, thinking that an unconstitutional proposal is con-
stitutional. 
In dealing with the possible implementation of unconstitutional 
rules, the Constitution seeks to prevent, but nevertheless accepts, 
human error.  A conscientious legislator should do the same, and be 
prepared to accept possible error in the pursuit of the public good.  
For the legislator, the relevant errors come when an unconstitutional 
rule is implemented despite its unconstitutionality.  Suppose that a 
Representative is voting on a bill, one provision of which is in that 
Representative’s view, wholly unconstitutional but that is believed to 
be valid by others.  If the bill is passed and the provision is imple-
mented, an undesirable consequence will have followed from pas-
sage.  But if the bill has other important benefits, the Representative 
can support it in good conscience.  That is exactly what the ratifiers 
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of the Constitution did, accepting a risk (a near certainty) that some 
unconstitutional rules would be followed, in order to achieve goals 
that were worth that price. 
This reasoning implies that a conscientious Senator or Repre-
sentative could not vote for legislation in the hopes that a provision 
that legislator believed to be unconstitutional would be implemented.  
To do so would count as a benefit what the Constitution counts as a 
cost and so would not be the proper performance of the legislative 
function.  But legislation is about trade-offs, and a good to be 
achieved by a constitutional provision may well justify the harm in-
flicted by an unconstitutional one that is implemented when it should 
not be. 
This conception of congressional duty regarding the constitution-
ality of legislation vindicates the Senators and Representatives over 
the decades who have voted for legislation despite constitutional 
doubts.  It is consistent with a practice in which Senators and Repre-
sentatives are genuinely concerned about the constitutionality of the 
legislation before them but do not feel an unqualified obligation 
never to support any bill with any unconstitutional, or possibly partly 
unconstitutional, provision.  Without conducting an inquiry into 
Congress’s behavior through history, I will suggest that it is at least as 
consistent with this account of congressional duty as with the account 
that has an absolute obligation. 
Understood as qualified and not absolute, the obligation to avoid 
creating invalid rules that might be treated as valid does not imply 
that the Constitution’s provisions about congressional power operate 
at rule level.  The qualified obligation is designed for situations of 
uncertainty and requires legislators to make good-faith judgments 
about competing considerations.  That obligation is consistent with 
constitutional rules that make some legislation invalid as applied, the 
operation of which, therefore, cannot be perfectly predicted by legis-
lators at the time they legislate.  The possibility that some applications 
may be invalid is, by itself, no problem, provided that they are treated 
as invalid.  The possibility that an invalid enactment may erroneously 
be treated as valid is a consideration for legislators to weigh, but it is 
not a result that must be avoided come what may.  This qualified ob-
ligation is one that conscientious members of Congress can comply 
with even if they do not know for certain the constitutional status of 
their legislation when they legislate. 
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2.  Exercises of Final Decisional Authority and Constitutional Duty 
While arguing that legislators have a qualified obligation concern-
ing constitutionality, I have also argued that judges have an absolute 
obligation.  Judges’ function entails applying the law; the Constitu-
tion sometimes provides the applicable rule and always constrains the 
sub-constitutional law, and so judges must always apply the Constitu-
tion if they are to support it as they promise.  That contrast invites the 
question whether an important concept is at work in the distinction 
between legislators considering their powers and judges deciding 
cases.  I will argue that there is, that the judicial function is a leading 
example of a more general category of governmental function, and 
that constitutional provisions that establish such functions confer a 
conceptually distinctive form of power. 
This Part of the Article begins by elaborating on the distinction 
between courts and legislatures by way of understanding the different 
kinds of constitutional rules that empower them.  It then discusses 
the justification for the principle that final decisional authority brings 
with it an absolute duty to exercise that authority in accordance with 
the law being applied and concludes by seeking to identify other con-
texts in which the Constitution gives final decisional authority and an 
accompanying absolute duty. 
Judicial power is the power to be wrong.  Judgments bind whether 
or not they rest on correct determinations of fact and law.  Because 
the function of adjudication is to provide final resolution of disputes, 
the outcomes of adjudication must be respected without regard to 
their correctness.  As Justice Jackson said, the Supreme Court of the 
United States is not final because it is infallible; it is infallible only be-
cause it is final.60 
Although courts’ authority does not rest on the substantive cor-
rectness of their decisions, purported judicial acts nevertheless must 
comply with the law, including the Constitution, in an important 
sense.  Legal rules identify individuals as judges, constitute courts out 
of judges, and establish the jurisdiction of courts.61  Those rules must 
 
 60 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“There is no doubt 
that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of 
state courts would also be reversed.  We are not final because we are infallible, but we are 
infallible only because we are final.”). 
 61 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (explaining how Article III vests the judicial power of the 
United States in the federal courts); id. (referring to the fact that courts are composed of 
judges); id. art. III, § 2 (setting out the potential jurisdiction of the federal judiciary); id. 
(dealing with the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); id. (explaining how the Appoint-
ments Clause of Article II governs appointments of federal judges and other officers). 
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be relied on by non-judicial actors, including executive officials who 
enforce judicial decrees when necessary.  In order to perform their 
function, the United States Marshalls must be able to distinguish 
judges from imposters, and legal rules make that distinction. 
With respect to judicial power, the relevant constitutional rules 
identify an authoritative decision-maker.  Matters are more compli-
cated with respect to Congress.  Some rules identify the individuals 
who make up the legislature.  Those rules are applied by other actors, 
private and official, who must know whether purported acts of Con-
gress really come from Congress.  Those rules in general provide 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for legal effectiveness.  In or-
der to be valid, duly adopted statutes must also be consistent with the 
provisions granting and limiting federal legislative power.  Those 
provisions, too, are applied by others, for example, by the courts in 
conducting judicial review.  Judicial and legislative powers are thus 
asymmetrical in this respect because the courts have power to act fi-
nally whereas Congress, in general, does not. 
That asymmetry in function helps justify an asymmetry in duty.  
The principle that judges have an absolute obligation to apply the law 
to the best of their ability may seem obvious, but the obvious often is 
so for a good reason.  Courts are central to the enforcement of the 
law.  To say that judges may decide for themselves whether to enforce 
the law would be to drain the legal rules of their mandatory character 
in a crucial context and turn them into mere admonitions.62  That 
same reasoning applies analogically whenever some official or institu-
tion has the last word in applying a legal norm.  Consider the age re-
quirement for membership in the House; Representatives must be at 
least twenty-five years old.63  The qualifications of Representatives are 
conclusively assessed by the House.64  If its members have no obliga-
tion to look to the age requirement in resolving an eligibility contest, 
then the age requirement has no legal consequences whatsoever, and 
Representatives may in conscience simply disregard it.  It is one thing 
to say that not all legal rules are judicially enforced; the role of the 
 
 62 That is not to say that legal norms are mere admonitions if they are not judicially en-
forced at all.  It makes perfect sense to say that someone other than the courts is charged 
with enforcing, or following, a legal rule.  According to the position I am urging here, 
when that happens, someone else will have an uncompromising obligation to enforce or 
comply.  The unreasonable arrangement is one in which the courts are charged with fi-
nally applying the law in order to enforce it, but have no obligation to apply it. 
 63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained 
to the Age of twenty five Years . . . .).” 
 64 Id. art. I, § 5 (explaining that each house of Congress is the judge of the elections and the 
qualifications of its own members). 
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House and Senate as election judges proves that the Constitution 
works that way.  But a constitutional rule that binds no one violates 
the basic principle of pragmatics that provisions are included in or-
der to make a difference. 
As this reasoning demonstrates, Professor Rosenkranz poses a pro-
found question when he asks, to whom are constitutional provisions 
addressed?65  Although not all of them create duties, so that not all of 
them can be violated, different constitutional rules do have different 
relationships with different addressees.  Rules about legislative power 
tell members of Congress what they are capable of doing but general-
ly do not tell them what they are required to do.  Those same rules, 
addressed to the courts, produce a different effect because they in-
teract with the courts’ obligation to decide according to law.  As ad-
dressed to private people, the rules about power have yet another re-
lationship with their audience.  They figure in the process by which 
private people determine their own legal obligations, rights, powers, 
and liabilities.  In doing so, private people are subject to the possibil-
ity that a court will finally interpret their legal positions in a way that 
the private person believes to be erroneous but that will nevertheless 
be binding. 
With that great power of conclusive decision-making comes the 
great responsibility to exercise it according to the law.  One possibly 
paradoxical result of the interpretation presented here is that power 
generally does bring duty with it but that power-creating and power-
limiting provisions generally do not.  The Commerce Clause, for ex-
ample, does not impose on Congress a duty to exercise the power it 
grants in any particular way, precisely because it grants only a limited 
power.  Purported legislation in excess of that power is, pro tanto, 
void and hence, no exercise of power at all.  Duties arise only when a 
decisional power makes it possible for an actor, like a court, in a 
sense, to out-run the Constitution, for example, by holding valid a 
statutory provision that is invalid for lack of granted power.  A court 
does have power to decide a case on an incorrect legal premise, and 
therefore has an obligation to get the premise right. 
In this connection, I have so far discussed the Constitution’s pro-
visions concerning the powers of Congress, its provisions identifying 
the individuals who together make up that body, and the rules per-
forming a similar function for the courts.  The latter but not the for-
 
 65 Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 8, at 1240–41 (arguing that the President and not Con-
gress violates the Fourth Amendment because the Fourth Amendment’s command is im-
plicitly directed to the executive, in contrast with the First Amendment, which addresses 
its command to Congress). 
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mer, I have suggested, convey power to act conclusively.  Each 
house’s power to judge elections, by contrast, and the Senate’s power 
to try impeachments, involve final authority and hence a binding ob-
ligation to follow the law.  This observation raises the question; where 
else does the Constitution adopt that strategy? 
Although I will not attempt to answer that question systematically, 
two aspects of the Constitution are worth discussing here because 
they involve possible conclusive decisional authority in Congress and 
hence the absolute duties that accompany such authority.  The first 
has to do with Congress’s internal decision-making process.  Like the 
composition of the legislature, that topic is treated at some length by 
the Constitution.66  Those procedural rules might operate as criteria 
for the validity of the laws that Congress produces.  Under that ap-
proach, courts would assure themselves that federal laws they were 
called on to apply had been adopted in conformity with the applica-
ble procedures, or at least those prescribed by the Constitution itself.  
In general, the courts do not do this.  According to the Supreme 
Court’s “enrolled bill doctrine,” a form of finality operates in this 
context.67  When the Speaker of the House and presiding officer of 
the Senate present an enrolled bill to the President, their certifica-
tion is treated as conclusive by the courts.  The judiciary will not en-
tertain the argument that the enrolled text was not the text voted on, 
 
 66 E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (stating the constitutional requirements for both a bill to be-
come law and the presidential veto). 
 67 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), explains this doctrine.  It states, 
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President 
of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the 
two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress.  It is a declaration by the 
two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus at-
tested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional re-
quirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. . . . The 
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial de-
partment to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all 
bills authenticated in the manner stated:  leaving the courts to determine, when 
the question properly arises, whether the act, so authenticated, is in conformity 
with the Constitution. 
 Id. at 672. 
   Professors Adler and Dorf, discussing the issues raised in Field, suggest that some con-
stitutional provisions may be “perspectival” in the sense that “the content of some consti-
tutional norm, from the perspective of one actor, might be different from its content 
viewed from another perspective.”  Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Ex-
istence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1178 (2003).  Although they of-
ten will produce similar consequences, the ideas of perspectival provisions and final deci-
sional authority are different in that the former is about the content of the provision 
being applied, while the latter is about the authority of the officer or institution applying 
it. 
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or that the proper procedures were not followed.  If the enrolled bill 
doctrine is sound, the Speaker and President of the Senate have an 
unqualified obligation to enroll only those texts that have passed in 
compliance with applicable constitutional and congressional rules.  If 
they did not, there would again be a legal rule that bound no one. 
In general, however, congressional exercises of power are not fi-
nal in the way that a judgment is final.  Private people and courts are 
free to decide whether Congress’s purported laws satisfy the Constitu-
tion’s criteria for validity.  That may not be the case, however, with re-
spect to one very important power.  Article I, Section 8 concludes by 
giving Congress power to make all laws that are necessary and proper 
to carry into execution its other powers and those of other federal of-
ficers and departments.  Whether one legal rule is necessary and 
proper to carry out some purpose is a question of means and ends, a 
question that very often requires practical judgment.  Whether the 
First and Second Banks of the United States were useful for carrying 
out federal powers that involve the transfer of funds, for example, 
depended on the effectiveness of other ways of moving money, such 
as state banks.  That was a question of practical judgment, not legal 
interpretation. 
M’Culloch established the principle that when courts assess the 
constitutionality of legislation adopted under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, they defer to Congress’s practical judgments.68  Cer-
tainly, there is good reason for them to do that.  Senators and Repre-
sentatives are chosen in part because of their acumen in public af-
fairs.  The wisdom, learning, and uprightness recited in federal 
judicial commission may or may not include good policy judgment.  
If the Constitution itself requires such deference, then it confers on 
Congress a degree of finality.  Finality brings duty with it, so if others 
owe Congress that deference, Congress owes the country and the 
Constitution its best judgment on those questions of means and ends.  
Senators and Representatives also owe their constituents sincerity in 
this inquiry:  they should invoke the power when, but only when, they 
regard it as a means to an end, not an end in itself. 
Whether the Constitution itself requires that courts defer to Con-
gress’s means-ends judgments is a difficult question.  Also difficult is 
the question whether Congress has any duty to ensure that its legisla-
tion is consistent with the Constitution if the courts decide to give it 
 
 68 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420–21 (1819) (stating that judicial con-
sideration of the Necessary and Proper Clause should not diminish the right of Congress 
to use its discretion in enacting laws executing the constitutional powers of the govern-
ment). 
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deference but do not do so because the Constitution requires them 
to.  If such deference is required by the Constitution itself, then with 
respect to this particular power, Professor Rosenkranz’s analysis is 
applicable even if most powers have no duty with them:  exercises of 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause are valid or invalid as 
rules, not as applied to particular cases.  The means-end relationship 
is between the rule and the goal, not between specific applications of 
the rule.  M’Culloch upheld the Bank of the United States in all of its 
operations, not only when it acted as the federal government’s fiscal 
agent.69  The question was whether the Bank was useful, not whether 
every transaction that it engaged in was useful.70  As Professor 
Rosenkranz explains, Congress acts prospectively and generally, so its 
decisions about necessity and propriety are general and prospective 
and thus about rules.  If those decisions are entitled to deference, the 
deference applies to a decision about a rule, which should stand or 
fall as such. 
B.  Physical Acts of Government Agents and Congressional Power 
The vast bulk of constitutional provisions are about juridical acts.  
Congress engages in a juridical act when it passes a statute, a court 
performs such an act when it issues a judgment, and the President 
does so when he makes a treaty.  Not only the provisions that grant 
and limit power, but the more numerous provisions governing the 
staffing and procedures of institutions are in the service of those insti-
tutions’ ability to engage in juridical acts.  A few constitutional rules, 
however, may be interpreted as governing physical actions.  A search 
or seizure is a physical act, for example.71 
 
 69 Id. at 436. 
 70 It is easy to become confused on this issue and ask, for example, whether the statute at 
issue in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995), could have been applied to posses-
sion of a gun that had moved in interstate commerce or to an act of possession that 
somehow affected interstate commerce.  The Constitution, however, does not give Con-
gress power to regulate conduct that affects interstate commerce or objects that have 
been transported from one state to another.  Instead, it gives Congress power to regulate 
commerce, and to make laws necessary and proper to carry out that power.  Regulation of 
conduct that affects interstate commerce may or may not be so necessary and proper, de-
pending on the end Congress is seeking and the relationship between that end and the 
means of regulating conduct that is not itself interstate commerce.  If Congress has made 
a judgment about means and ends that is entitled to deference, that judgment will be 
about the rule that Congress has adopted, and the deference should apply to the rule as 
such, not application by application. 
 71 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (explaining that the Fourth Amendment secures the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, and against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures). 
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A physical act is not, as such, an exercise of power, so it is natural 
to think that rules that concern physical acts impose duties.  The Su-
preme Court has found that the Fourth Amendment imposes a duty 
on individuals who act under color of federal law, a duty that can be 
enforced through damages and injunctive proceedings.72  Professor 
Rosenkranz identifies some constitutional rules, including the Fourth 
Amendment, as susceptible to violation only by the executive.  Such 
rules, and only such rules, give rise to as-applied unconstitutionality 
in his system.73  Rosenkranz’s reference to violation, and his analysis 
more generally, strongly suggest that he, too, regards provisions that 
deal with physical acts by executive officers as imposing duties (and 
perhaps creating correlative rights). 
As the Court recognized in Bivens, there is another approach to 
the Fourth Amendment, one that prevailed for many decades.  Ac-
cording to that approach, the Constitution does not itself create du-
ties.  Rather, it limits the reach of official privilege and thus some-
times puts government officers in the legal position of private persons 
without the license to invade private rights that officers often have.  
In conducting a lawful search and seizure, federal officers may use 
force and damage private property without incurring damages liabil-
ity.  Lawful searches and seizures are privileged.  The Fourth 
Amendment takes that privilege away from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  An unreasonable search may be a tort, and if it is, the 
officer who conducts it will not have the defense of official privilege.74 
That traditional understanding is readily explained in terms of 
governmental power, even though the constitutional rules involved 
deal with physical acts.  One way to express the principle that the 
Constitution is fundamentally about power is to say that its basic func-
tion is to identify acts that are on behalf of the government, distin-
guishing them from those that are not.  Rules granting and withhold-
ing legislative power perform that function by determining whether a 
purported act of legislation is truly legislation, and thus truly on be-
 
 72 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 
(1971) (“[A] federal agent acting under color of his authority gives rise to a cause of ac-
tion for damages consequent upon his unconstitutional conduct.”). 
 73 Rosenkranz, Subjects, supra note 8, at 1240–41 (arguing that it is the President who violates 
the first clause of the Fourth Amendment by exercising an unreasonable search and that 
a constitutional claim under this clause is an “as-applied” challenge). 
 74 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390–91 (“In this scheme the Fourth Amendment would serve mere-
ly to limit the extent to which the agents could defend the state law tort suit by asserting 
that their actions were a valid exercise of federal power:  if the agents were shown to have 
violated the Fourth Amendment, such a defense would be lost to them and they would 
stand before the state law merely as private individuals.”). 
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half of the government.  If a private person signs a document pur-
porting to be an enrolled bill, nothing will happen because that per-
son is not the President.  The constitutional rules identifying some-
one as President and conferring on that individual the power to sign 
bills into law identify purported official acts that are truly official and 
exclude those that are not.  Just as a juridical act by someone who is 
not an official at all is ineffective, so is such an act by someone who is 
an official but whose power does not extend to that act.  Neither offi-
cials nor private persons can exercise power they do not have; the dif-
ference is that officials have some power, while non-officials have 
none at all. 
A similar distinction applies with respect to physical acts such as 
searches.  Agents of the government are privileged to engage in con-
duct, such as breaking down doors, that would be wrongful if done by 
private people.  Official privilege, of course, is available only to those 
who act on behalf of the government.  Private people, and officers of 
the government engaged in private acts, do not have this privilege.  A 
provision like the Fourth Amendment can ensure that an unreasona-
ble search will not be eligible for governmental privilege by providing 
that it is not to be treated as being on behalf of the government.  So 
understood, the Fourth Amendment is like the grants and limits of 
power in that it identifies acts that are and are not official.  The dif-
ference is in the nature of the acts involved:  to say that a juridical act 
is or is not official is to grant or limit power, while to say that a physi-
cal act is or is not official is to make available or to withhold official 
privilege. 
So understood, the Fourth Amendment limits the privileges avail-
able to government officers without itself imposing any duties.75  It 
thus operates as a limitation on the power of the legislature that pro-
duces application-level invalidity.  This analysis accords with Professor 
Rosenkranz’s in that it associates as-applied unconstitutionality with 
constitutional provisions that apply to the physical acts of government 
officers.  It differs from his approach in that it does not require that 
such provisions impose duties on officers and so does not condition 
unconstitutionality on a constitutional violation by an officer. 
 
 75 Although the Court in Bivens concluded that the Fourth Amendment does impose a duty, 
and does create a cause of action, this was in addition to, and not a substitute for, the 
Amendment’s function as a limit on privileges.  Id. at 391–392 (“[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power regardless of whether 
the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised would prohibit or penalize the 
identical act if engaged in by a private citizen.”). 
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Limitations on congressional power that work this way do not im-
ply that legislators have duties to avoid this form of invalidity.  Such a 
duty would not accomplish anything, so there is no reason to attrib-
ute it to provisions that are already vindicated through nullity.  Con-
sider a statute authorizing Environmental Protection Agency en-
forcement officers to inspect certain business facilities during 
ordinary business hours.  Very likely, the vast bulk of such inspections 
will be reasonable.  Only in unusual circumstances will one be unrea-
sonable.  Those situations, being unusual, will not be readily identifi-
able in advance by a member of Congress.  The most that Congress 
could do to guard against the possibility of an unreasonable search 
would be to add a proviso that only reasonable searches are author-
ized.  That is true anyway.  If legislators have an absolute duty not to 
enact statutes that can ever have unconstitutional applications, then 
they are obliged to draft that way.  But such provisos are mere boiler-
plate and do not reflect the substantive judgments that legislators are 
elected to make; they just repeat the Constitution and tell enforce-
ment officers and courts what they already know.  A requirement that 
Congress include such nods to the Constitution would not add any-
thing to the as-applied invalidity of the statutes in question.  It would 
be pointless. 
Under the account of legislator duties developed in this Article, a 
member of Congress could, in good conscience, vote for the inspec-
tion statute without the disclaimer of unreasonable searches.  The 
practical difference between the statute with and without the dis-
claimer would be zero or very close to it.  Either way, executive offic-
ers and courts will make their own judgments about the reasonable-
ness of searches, uninfluenced by Congress’s statements on the 
subject.  The interest in avoiding actual results that the Constitution 
is designed to prevent would give hardly any reason to do no more 
than repeat the obvious.  If it were at all costly, a conscientious legis-
lator could leave it out. 
III.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A RULE ABOUT RULES 
Even if legislators do not generally have duties arising from the 
grants and limits of legislative power, and if the First Amendment in 
particular imposes no duties, there is good reason to believe that the 
latter operates with respect to rules and not their specific applica-
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tions.76  According to this reading, the First Amendment operates at 
rule level because it is directed to the content of rules and the deci-
sions of legislatures.  As I will explain, the text readily lends itself to 
that interpretation. 
While the text suggests that the First Amendment makes rules as 
such valid or invalid, that reading may seem to be difficult to square 
with contemporary doctrine.  Certainly, the Supreme Court’s cases 
exhibit some rule-level invalidity, often under the label of 
overbreadth.  But it is just as well established that some rules are inva-
lid only as applied in some circumstances, not all.  I will argue, how-
ever, that as-applied invalidity can be explained as a species of rule-
level invalidity.  That explanation depends on an account of severa-
bility, according to which, severance, too, operates at rule level.  In 
this view, severance consists of replacing constitutionally impermissi-
ble norms with fallback norms that are explicit or implicit in the rele-
vant legislation.  Because it replaces one rule with another, this form 
of severance accommodates the assumption that the First Amend-
ment invalidates rules in their entirety, not only in particular applica-
tions.  This way of thinking about severance provides a formal recon-
ciliation of a First Amendment that operates at rule level and 
outcomes that appear to include invalidity as applied.  In addition, it 
helps explain why the First Amendment limits the rules that the legis-
lature may adopt, even when some of the applications of those rules 
could be achieved constitutionally by another rule. 
As Professor Rosenkranz stresses, the First Amendment refers to 
Congress.  That might indicate only that it limits legislative power, 
which by itself would have no implications for the difference between 
facial and as-applied invalidity.  The Fourth Amendment, I have ar-
gued above, limits legislative power but operates by picking out appli-
cations.  Nevertheless, the reference to Congress points in the direc-
tion of a rule that deals with the output of the legislature.  That 
output takes the form of rules, which in turn have applications.  More 
important in this connection is that the text then says that Congress 
shall make no law.  A law is a rule, a general norm that operates in 
concrete situations by picking out certain aspects of those situations 
and prescribing the consequences thereof.  A ban on arson forbids 
specified actions that constitute setting fire to a structure, without re-
gard to other aspects of those actions.  As far as the law against arson 
 
 76 The previous Part discussed the First Amendment, along with other provisions of the 
Constitution, that grant and limit federal legislative power.  This Part is entirely about the 
First Amendment and does not address whether other grants or limitations operate at a 
rule level or application level. 
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is concerned, it is irrelevant whether the fire was set as part of a ter-
rorist campaign or in order to protest inadequate fire safety regula-
tion.  Laws are abstract and general. 
To say that certain laws are not to be enacted, or shall be void, is 
thus readily interpreted as blocking the validity of certain rules and 
not others.  Considered as a law, and hence as a rule, the ban on ar-
son would not be a law abridging the freedom of speech, even 
though some of the actions to which it applies constitute expression.  
The analytical categories relating to power can be adapted to express 
this distinction. 
If one person is able to alter another’s legal positions, the former 
has power, and the latter has liability to the exercise of power.  When 
Congress has authority granted by the Constitution, it has power, and 
those subject to that authority have liability.  The opposite of power is 
disability.  A minor, with only limited contractual capacity, has sub-
stantial disability with respect to making contracts.  The correlative of 
disability is immunity.  Potential contracting partners of minors have 
substantial immunity from the exercise of the minors’ contracting 
capacity.  So, if Congress cannot effect some change in the law, it is 
subject to disability and others are immune from that change in their 
legal positions. 
The standard categories are designed to describe results, not the 
rules that produce those results.77  Under the Constitution, Congress 
can lack power and have disability either because it has no enumerat-
ed authority or because an otherwise-applicable grant of authority is 
subject to an affirmative limitation like the First Amendment.  Af-
firmative limitations like the First Amendment produce both disabili-
ties for Congress and immunities for private persons.  Because disa-
bility and immunity correlate with one another, they go together, and 
neither is more fundamental than the other. 
Although that is true of the categories themselves, they do suggest 
a way of conceiving the rules that produce those results.  Just as duty 
is conceived from the standpoint of a potential actor, so power and 
disability are conceived from the standpoint of a potential juridical 
actor.  Liability and immunity use the standpoint of the person whose 
 
 77 Duties, liberties, powers, rights, and the other analytical categories “are simply character-
istic positions which people have in authoritative directive arrangements.  Put differently, 
they are the consequences of characteristic kinds of directions which people are given in 
such arrangements.”  HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 128.  In distinguishing disability 
rules from immunity rules, I am seeking to identify the different authoritative directive 
arrangements that give rise to the positions. 
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legal positions are potentially acted upon.78  The First Amendment is 
concerned with one particular legal position:  liberty to make deci-
sions, for example concerning religious exercise.  From the stand-
point of the person who wishes to exercise religion or speak, the im-
portant question may be whether that conduct is permitted or not.  If 
the conduct is subject to a prohibition, the content of the prohibition 
is likely to be of secondary importance.  Someone who plans to deliv-
er a fiery speech in public may well not care whether it is forbidden as 
an unlawful assembly, or as disturbing the peace, or as making exces-
sive noise after 9 P.M. 
For the individual subject to regulation, it would be useful if the 
Constitution were to describe kinds of conduct that could not be for-
bidden, could not be subject to adverse consequences, or could not 
be subject to adverse consequences without some strong justification.  
Such a description, unrelated to the criteria used by potentially ad-
verse laws, would create a sphere of liberty protected against govern-
ment control.  It would limit zoning laws as well as laws about political 
demonstrations.  I will call a constitutional norm based on such a de-
scription an immunity rule.  Such a norm would, of course, have con-
sequences with respect to the other analytical categories.  An individ-
ual with immunity because of it would not have liability.  If the norm 
were a limit on federal power, Congress would have disability and not 
power. 
As Professor Rosenkranz shows, a constitutional immunity rule 
would pose a problem for members of Congress seeking to legislate 
in a manner consistent with the Constitution.  If the Constitution also 
imposes a duty on legislators, they would not be able to comply with it 
in any useful fashion.  Congress could include a boilerplate statement 
that the statutory rule is inapplicable when applying it would be un-
constitutional.  That would discharge the legislators’ duty but would 
leave one to wonder why the Constitution imposed that duty. 
By contrast, a constitutional limitation formulated from the 
standpoint of the legislature, describing rules that may and may not 
be validly enacted, could give legislators meaningful guidance that 
would actually affect their decision-making.  If the First Amendment 
requires that rules that target expression be narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest, Congress will know that it may adopt such laws 
 
 78 See id. at 134–37 (discussing the characteristic positions of non-actors). 
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only when it is pursuing such an interest and will have good reason to 
be careful in its drafting.79 
A provision like the First Amendment, thus, might well adopt the 
standpoint of the legislator rather than the person subject to legisla-
tive power.  It might provide descriptions of legal rules that are not 
consistent with it and thereby guide legislators in devising rules that 
are.  A constitutional limitation that describes impermissible rules, 
and thus operates at the rule level and not at the application level, 
may be called a disability rule.  Such a rule, of course, would negate 
power, produce immunity, and negate liability.  Unlike an immunity 
rule, a disability rule readily could provide useful information to leg-
islators, information that would enable them to comply with a duty or 
achieve their goal of valid legislation. 
If the First Amendment contains only disability rules, then it al-
ways leads to facial invalidity.  If it contains immunity rules, then it 
will sometimes lead to as-applied invalidity.  If only immunity rules 
are to be found, the First Amendment will lead to facial invalidity on-
ly when it is possible to say that every application of a rule must nec-
essarily run afoul of the immunity called for by the Constitution.  
This is the kind of facial invalidity contemplated by the Court’s well-
known and controversial statement in United States v. Salerno,80 which 
says that facial challenges are difficult to sustain because they can 
succeed only if the party challenging the statute can show that every 
possible application of the rule is separately invalid.81 
Current First Amendment case law can be accounted for only if 
there are at least some disability rules.  A standard example involves 
flag-burning.  Rules forbidding it are invalid as such, and hence inva-
lid even when applied to conduct that permissibly could be punished 
pursuant to some other rule.82  Burning a stolen flag, for example, 
 
 79 Congress’s reason for drafting this way need not result from any duty to do so.  The in-
centive to produce a valid as opposed to an invalid law is substantial, even if the result of 
non-compliance with the First Amendment is only nullity. 
 80 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 81 Id. at 745 (holding that a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge 
to mount successfully because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances 
exists under which the act would be valid, and establishing that respondents have failed 
to demonstrate that the Bail Reform Act is facially unconstitutional). 
 82 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), held that Johnson, who burned a flag, could not be 
convicted under Texas’s statute forbidding the desecration of venerated objects.  The 
State of Texas argued that the application of the statute to Johnson could be vindicated 
on the grounds that it would prevent breach of the peace, as burning a flag may lead to 
violence.  The Court responded that Texas had another statute forbidding breach of the 
peace, implying that when the two statutes overlapped and the breach of the peace law 
was applied for the legitimate reason of preventing violence, it could forbid an act of flag 
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may be punished as destruction of property.  An immunity rule can-
not produce that result, nor can any reading of the First Amendment 
that leads only to as-applied invalidity.  Salerno’s broad statement can-
not be squared with the Court’s practice.83  In Matthew Adler’s 
phrase, the rights protected by the Constitution are at least to some 
extent rights against rules.84 
Whether the First Amendment makes some conduct immune 
from any rule that would regulate it, or otherwise produces as-applied 
invalidity, is a difficult question.  There is good reason to think that it 
does not.  Expression and religious exercise are actions; as John Hart 
Ely said, burning a draft card or a flag to convey a message is 100% 
speech and 100% action.85  There is a difference between regulating 
actions that are identified by their expressive conduct and regulating 
actions that are not so identified, but an action is an action.  That is 
how some rules that are facially void nevertheless have some applica-
tions that could be achieved by another rule.  A constitutional im-
munity rule describes conduct that cannot be reached by any statuto-
ry rule, no matter what its content.  It is very difficult to see what that 
description might be.  Certainly, religious exercise and speech do not 
fit the bill, as many instances of both may be regulated under some 
other description. 
The First Amendment definitely does not include immunity rules 
if it is true, as the Court sometimes says, that general and neutral 
rules may incidentally regulate religious exercise or expression with-
out constitutional difficulty.86  The easiest examples of general and 
 
burning.  491 U.S. at 407–10 (asserting that the Court’s holding will not disable the State 
of Texas from preserving the peace). 
 83 Professor Richard Fallon has described Salerno’s treatment of facial and as-applied invalid-
ity as part of the fallacious conventional wisdom on the topic.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact 
and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 926–31 (2011) (discussing the 
conventional reasoning in regards to facial challenges in Salerno). 
 84 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules:  The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 157 (1998) (discussing Salerno’s conception of the facial invalidity of a 
rule).  As the title indicates, Professor Adler’s argument concerns the moral structure of 
the Constitution.  My argument is about its analytic structure. 
 85 John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration:  A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495 (1975) (“But burning a 
draft card to express opposition to the draft is an undifferentiated whole, 100% action 
and 100% expression.  It involves no conduct that is not at the same time communica-
tion, and no communication that does not result from conduct.”). 
 86 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (“In 
addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish 
the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of 
burdening a particular religious practice.”). 
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neutral rules are those that establish private rights without referring 
to constitutionally protected conduct.  Individuals are not at liberty to 
use other people’s property for First Amendment purposes. 
If general and neutral rules may indeed restrict constitutionally 
protected conduct, then they are valid per se, valid in all of their ap-
plications.87  And if there are rules that are wholly valid, no matter 
what conduct they are applied to, then there are no immunity rules 
because there is no conduct that may not be regulated by any rule. 
Immunity rules, as I have defined them, are not, of course, the on-
ly kind of constitutional norm that produces application-level invalid-
ity, though they are probably the most natural example.  Any reading 
of the First Amendment that leads to application-level invalidity, 
however, encounters a serious textual objection.  The text refers to 
laws, and laws are readily understood to mean whole rules.  To call a 
single application a law is quite unnatural.88  Yet, if rules are to be in-
valid as applied in some circumstances and not in others, the word 
“law” must include particular applications. 
Despite the force of that textual reasoning, First Amendment doc-
trine is not limited to facial invalidity.  It is filled with cases in which 
rules are invalid in some but not all of their applications, with the 
constitutional applications severable from the unconstitutional appli-
cations as far as both the Constitution and the statute involved are 
concerned.89  The fact that application-level invalidity is so common 
 
 87 I use terms like protected conduct to refer to the kinds of conduct that the First Amend-
ment mentions.  As the rule-based reading of the First Amendment itself shows, it is pos-
sible to refer to such conduct without implying that there are disability rules as I have de-
fined them.  In Professor Adler’s terminology, a category of conduct can be protected 
against certain rules, not all rules that happen to affect it. 
 88 That is true when the rules involved are statutory.  Common law rules are different.  They 
have no canonical verbal formulation but instead are found in their applications.  “More-
over, even though the decisional doctrine is respected in later cases, its ratio decidenci is 
not imprisoned in any single set of words; and this gives it a flexibility which the statute 
does not have.”  HART & SACKS, supra note 23, at 126 (discussing the flexibility of the de-
cisional doctrine).  As far as the common law is concerned, one might well say that each 
application, or each application that meets some description, is itself a law.  Congress, 
however, passes statutes that are single sets of words, prisons or not. 
 89 For example, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment did not permit a private action to recover damages, under applicable 
federal and Pennsylvania statutes, for public disclosure of unlawfully intercepted private 
telephone conversations.  The Court relied on facts specific to the case, in particular that 
the intercepted conversation was about a matter of public concern (negations of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement for public employees).  Id. at 535.  The implication was that 
application of the statutes in other cases would be constitutionally permissible, for exam-
ple, if the intercepted conversations were wholly private and very sensitive in their con-
tent.  In order for such a case to go forward, the Court would have to conclude both that 
 
538 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:2 
 
indicates that it has strong substantive appeal as an implementation 
of First Amendment principles. 
One solution to this difficulty is to accept both facial and as-
applied invalidity at the price of some stretching of the text.  The 
word “law” may include specific instances as well as whole rules.  An-
other solution is available, however, one according to which, all First 
Amendment invalidity is rule-level invalidity.  That approach entails 
thinking about severability in terms that are more natural with re-
spect to the severance of distinct provisions of a statute than to the 
severance of applications of a single rule from one another.  Deter-
mining whether parts of a statute are severable from one another in-
volves interpreting the statute in light of a contingency and identify-
ing the statute’s guidance, implicit or explicit, concerning its 
operation in light of that contingency.  The contingency is that the 
statute is, to some extent, unconstitutional.90  When that contingency 
arises, it often raises the question whether one application or provi-
sion is conditional on the validity of another.  In the leading severa-
bility case of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,91 for example, Alaska Airlines 
was subject to labor-related regulation under a statute that empow-
ered the Federal Aviation Administration as regulator and gave Con-
gress a legislative veto over the agency’s decisions.92  Alaska Airlines 
argued that because the legislative veto was unconstitutional under 
INS v. Chadha,93 and the regulatory provisions were implicitly condi-
tioned on the availability of that congressional check on agency pow-
 
the publication could be prohibited consistently with the Constitution and that the dif-
ferent applications of the statutes were severable from one another. 
   In considering severability, it is important to see that it operates at different levels.  As 
Bartnicki suggests, different applications of the same rule may be severable from one an-
other.  Different provisions of statutes, which generally mean different rules, may also be 
severable or inseverable from one another.  I will argue that the two forms of severability 
have more in common than may seem, but they are also significantly distinct from one 
another.  For example, it is possible for one rule in a statute to be invalid as such without 
the entire statute being void.  When that happens, the applications of the rule are, in a 
sense, inseverable from one another (though not necessarily in the sense in which that 
term is normally used), but the different provisions are severable. 
 90 The inquiry is often put by asking what the legislature would have done had it known that 
the statute as adopted was partly or wholly unconstitutional.  Another way of putting the 
same question, more consistent with thinking about statutory construction in terms of 
meaning as opposed to legislative preferences, is to ask how the statute deals with that 
possibility.  The former formulation suggests an inquiry into legislators’ desires, the latter 
an inquiry into the statute’s directives concerning a situation that has arisen under it. 
 91 480 U.S. 678 (1987). 
 92 Id. at 680–82 (describing the scheme under the Employee Protection Program and not-
ing that it contains a legislative-veto provision). 
 93 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (holding that it is unconstitutional for one house of Congress to 
unilaterally veto decisions made by the executive branch). 
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er, the regulatory provisions were inoperative.94  The Court found the 
legislative veto severable from the substantive requirements of the 
statute and so rejected the claim that those requirements were inop-
erative.95 
Sometimes, legislatures address the question of severability with a 
proviso stating that if any provision or application of a statute is 
found invalid, other provisions and applications shall remain in 
force.96  Such clauses reflect the possibility that some, but not all, ap-
plications of a rule may be unconstitutional.  Constitutional limita-
tions can be more complicated than that, however, and sometimes 
Congress explicitly addresses more complex contingencies.  The 
Constitution disallows some combinations of statutory provisions, 
each of which is innocuous by itself.  Here, the leading case is Bowsher 
v. Synar,97 which involved the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduc-
tion act.  The constitutional problem arose from the combination of 
a grant of power to an officer and a provision regarding the removal 
of the officer.  The statute gave the Comptroller General authority to 
calculate and order certain reductions in appropriations.98  That 
power was unobjectionable.  It could have been conferred on the 
Secretary of the Treasury, for example, without difficulty.  The 
Comptroller General was removable by statute.99  By itself, that too 
was unobjectionable because Congress may provide for removal by 
statute of some people who work for the government. 
The Court concluded, however, that the combination was not 
constitutional.  Implementing statutes is an executive function, and 
Congress may not have the kind of influence over an officer who per-
 
 94 Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 682–83 (describing Alaska Airlines' argument that the veto 
provision was unconstitutional under Chadha and that the entire program therefore was 
invalid because the veto provision was not severable from the rest of the statute). 
 95 Id. at 697 (holding that the language, structure, and legislative history of the statute pro-
vided an uncontradicted view of congressional intent regarding severance of the veto). 
 96 Typical is the severability provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which the 
Court addressed in Chadha, as follows:  “If any particular provision of this Act, or the ap-
plication thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and 
the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”  462 
U.S. at 932 (citing the separability note following 8 U.S.C. § 1101).  That clause addresses 
both the severability of applications of a single provision from one another and the sever-
ability of separate provisions from one another. 
 97 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 98 Id. at 718 (noting that the statute required the Directors of the Office of Management 
and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office to report, jointly, their deficit estimates 
and budget reduction calculations to the Comptroller General). 
 99 Id. at 727–29 (noting that although nominated by the President, the Comptroller General 
is only removable by Congress). 
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forms such functions that comes with removal by statute.100  Together, 
the power and the removal provision were inconsistent with the grant 
to Congress of legislative and not executive power, even though nei-
ther the power nor the removal provision was unconstitutional in iso-
lation. 
The drafters of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation were 
aware of the constitutional difficulty.  They wanted to prepare for the 
possibility that their preferred arrangement was unconstitutional.  A 
simple affirmation of severability, however, would not have been ade-
quate.  When two provisions in combination create the constitutional 
problem, saying that the constitutional part should be preserved 
when the unconstitutional part is lost does not provide adequate 
guidance.  Neither part alone is either constitutional or unconstitu-
tional.  Nor did the drafters wish simply to identify one provision that 
should survive; their second choice arrangement was neither one in 
which the sequestration process did not exist at all nor one in which 
the power to decide on sequestration was held by the Comptroller 
General, and the Comptroller could not be removed by Congress.  If 
they could not have the power in the Comptroller, the drafters want-
ed the power to be with someone else.  As a result, the statute con-
tained an elaborate fallback arrangement that would operate if the 
primary arrangement was unconstitutional.101 
As Michael Dorf has explained, conventional severability provi-
sions are one form of fallback or back-up law.102  Standard severability 
clauses provide explicitly for two common contingencies:  those in 
which a single provision in a statute is invalid, and the question arises 
whether other provisions are still operative, and those in which a pro-
vision is invalid in one application, and the question arises whether 
 
100 See id. at 722 (noting that Congress may not have an active role in supervising those who 
execute the law); id. at 727–32 (noting that the congressional removal power gives Con-
gress substantial control over the Comptroller General). 
101 Under the fallback arrangement, the joint report of the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, which under 
the primary rule was presented to the Comptroller General, was presented to a special 
joint committee of Congress.  The joint committee would report deficit reduction legisla-
tion on an expedited schedule, with the reported legislation governed by special rules 
calling for an up-or-down vote in each house.  Id. at 718–19. 
102 Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 303, 305 (2007) (“The most widely 
used kind of fallback provision is a severability clause, which provides that in the event 
that the original law is held partly invalid, a fallback of the original law minus the invalid 
provision or application will take effect.”).  Professor Dorf goes on to explain that “[l]ess 
commonly, fallback law takes the form of substitute provisions, rather than merely the 
truncated version of the original law that a severability clause produces,” and he uses the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation as an example.  Id. 
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other applications of the provision, or other provisions, are still oper-
ative.  Standard severability clauses do not address the situation in 
which a provision is wholly invalid, and the question is whether some 
similar provision is available as a fallback.  That contingency is one 
for which Congress can provide, explicitly or implicitly, even though 
making such arrangements explicitly is unusual. 
Rule-level invalidity under the First Amendment is like the situa-
tion in Bowsher in that the constitutional flaw is with a whole, not just 
one of its parts.  In Bowsher, the whole was made up of multiple provi-
sions.  With rule-level invalidity, the whole is the rule as opposed to its 
applications.  If a rule is invalid as a whole, it cannot be severed into 
permissible and impermissible applications. 
The possibility of a fallback arrangement explains how a rule can 
be virtually severable even if it is wholly invalid and hence not actually 
severable.  Suppose that Congress makes it a crime to incite violence 
against federal officers but does not require a clear and present dan-
ger that violence will ensue.  If someone is prosecuted after having 
incited violence in circumstances of clear and present danger, a 
fallback rule question arises.  Under current doctrine, the statute 
could not validly be applied in circumstances lacking the clear and 
present danger.103  If the First Amendment is an immunity rule, those 
applications would be invalid, and the question would be the ordi-
nary severability question, whether other applications are severable.  
But if the First Amendment is a disability rule, the statute, as drafted, 
is wholly void.  The question, then, is whether Congress has provided 
for a back-up rule that includes the clear and present danger re-
quirement.  If it has, the substitute version of the rule may be applied 
when the requisite danger is present.  And if Congress may do that 
implicitly, and it has, or has done so through an ordinary severability 
provision that is read to produce a new rule when appropriate, then a 
substitute rule may be available even if Congress has not provided 
one in depth, the way it did in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute. 
This understanding of severability can account for the phenome-
non of severance while remaining consistent with the principle that 
all invalidity is rule-level invalidity.  It thus can reconcile a rule-level 
understanding of the First Amendment with both long-standing doc-
trine and the obvious appeal of severability, or its functional equiva-
lent, in some circumstances.  The presence or absence of an accepta-
 
103 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that politi-
cal speech allegedly inciting violence may be punished only when there is an imminent 
threat of lawless action or a “clear and present danger” of violence occurring). 
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ble fallback arrangement will determine whether a statutory rule is de 
facto severable even though, according to the rule-level reading of 
the First Amendment, no rule is de jure severable. 
That reconciliation can be wholly formal, just another way of ex-
pressing the results in cases that do and do not find severability.  
There is substance here as well, however, both in this understanding 
of severability and in the more fundamental principle that the First 
Amendment is about legislative rules.  As to severability through 
fallback rules, if that is how statutory norms can, in effect, be partially 
unconstitutional, then they should be wholly unconstitutional when 
no fallback arrangement is available.  Some of the leading justifica-
tions and explanations for facial invalidity have just that built into 
them:  they operate when there is not or cannot be a secondary 
norm.  And as to the more basic idea that the First Amendment is 
concerned with rules as such, those same justifications and explana-
tions are based on the characteristic weaknesses and strengths of leg-
islatures as institutions. 
Justice Hans Linde, in his classic article concerning facial invalidi-
ty, argued that the Supreme Court had rightly held the Ohio statute 
at issue in Brandenburg v. Ohio104 to be void on its face.105  In Justice 
Linde’s view, all statutory rules that are justified by the prevention of 
criminal activity, and that seek to prevent it by identifying speech with 
impermissible content, are wholly invalid.  He distinguished speech-
specific rules from more general rules, such as a ban on obstructing 
the draft, that apply to speech in some circumstances.  The latter 
might be permissibly applied to speech that creates a clear and pre-
sent danger that the prohibited effect will come about, he main-
tained, but the former are wholly unconstitutional.106 
His argument emphasizes that the text of the First Amendment 
refers to a legislature and its product, law, and explains that textual 
focus with a rationale about the distinctive characteristics of legisla-
tures and their decision-making process.107  Because legislatures nec-
 
104 Id. at 444. 
105 Linde, supra note 1, at 1165 (explaining that the Court held that the Ohio statute was 
unconstitutional on its face and did not address whether constitutional immunity applied 
to Bradenburg’s conduct under the circumstances).  Whether the Court so held in Bran-
denburg is subject to some doubt, but that doubt does not affect Linde’s argument insofar 
as it concerns the First Amendment’s meaning. 
106 Id. at 1174 (“‘Clear and present danger’ is of no use in judging the constitutionality of 
legislation that in terms restricts the permissible content of speech.”). 
107 Id. (“Legislation directed in terms at expression, and particularly expression of political, 
social, or religious views, or against association for the purpose of such expression, should 
be found void on its face.  The factual circumstances of the particular instance of expres-
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essarily operate in advance by adopting general and prospective rules, 
they cannot reliably describe the content of messages that will very 
likely give rise to substantive harms like obstruction of the draft or, as 
in Brandenburg, violence.108  Linde illustrated the problem with the 
language of the New York Criminal Anarchy Act of 1902, which the 
Supreme Court had sustained, language that was used virtually verba-
tim in a large number of later state and federal statutes.109  The New 
York statute was adopted in the wake of the assassination of President 
McKinley and was inspired by fears of revolutionary anarchists.110  In 
Linde’s view, legislative judgment about dangerous messages made in 
1902, directed at nineteenth-century bomb-throwers, was of minimal 
relevance to later circumstances, involving for example post-World 
War II Communists and the Ku Klux Klan in Ohio in the late 1960s.111  
He concluded that legislatures are institutionally incapable of making 
the kind of judgment that is necessary if only truly dangerous speech 
is to be suppressed.112  Hence, their attempts to prevent violence by 
describing impermissible messages are laws abridging the freedom of 
speech considered as rules, and wholly invalid. 
If Linde is correct, no fallback rule that operates by describing 
prohibited messages can be constitutional, even if the legislature 
adopts one.  Although more general rules that sometimes apply to 
speech are not invalid per se on his account, it is hard to see why a 
legislature would adopt such a statutory norm as a fallback, rather 
 
sion cannot logically bear upon the constitutionality of the law.  This follows, I believe, 
from the text of the first amendment and from the nature of legislation, and it is con-
firmed by the experience with the contrary use of ‘clear and present danger,’ to which 
Justice Douglas alludes in Brandenburg.”). 
108 Id. at 1175–76 (“[T]here is a constitutional difference [between rules that address acts 
and rules that address words], and . . . it is apparent when we focus on the legislative pro-
cess, to which the first amendment was addressed, rather than on judicial defense of ‘pro-
tected’ expression, which is a later development.  The objective conditions under which 
the particular expression occurs, the fourth element of analysis identified earlier—
whether stated as ‘clear and present danger’ or some other formula—can be a factor at 
the time when suppression of that particular occurrence is before a court.  It cannot easi-
ly be an element in the constitutionality of the decision to make a law proscribing a kind 
of speech or publication for the future.  Yet the first amendment is addressed to that leg-
islative decision, in the legislative forum, at that time.”). 
109 Id. at 1176 (discussing that the New York statute was upheld as applied to Benjamin 
Gitlow in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)). 
110 Id. (“To the extent that this enactment represented a legislative diagnosis of a substantive 
evil, the evil was presumably the threat of . . . the politics of anarchists.”). 
111 Id. at 1178 (“A prescription . . . designed as an answer to 19th-century anarchy . . . was 
found constitutional in punishing the organization of the Communist Party immediately 
after World War II . . . .”). 
112 Id. at 1179–82 (outlining both the legislatures’ incapability to legislate speech and the 
undesirable outcomes of such legislation). 
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than simply adopting it as primary law.  Linde’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment, thus, would produce facial invalidity de facto, and 
not only de jure, because it would produce no virtual severability.  
Laws describing speech would be void, and there would be no 
fallback.  And the First Amendment, on Linde’s account, makes those 
laws void as such because of the way legislatures do their work.113 
Linde’s argument rests on the institutional limitations of legisla-
tures.  They are unable to describe, generally and in advance, the 
content of messages that are sufficiently likely to lead to harm suffi-
ciently serious to justify the messages’ suppression.  His reading 
would invalidate certain rules, even though the conduct forbidden by 
the rule could be punished by another; that is, the characteristic fea-
ture of rule-level invalidity.  Unconstitutionally overbroad rules have 
the same feature, as the term suggests:  their vice is their sweep, 
meaning that some of the conduct they burden could legitimately be 
burdened by a less sweeping rule. 
One standard explanation for the ban on overbroad laws rests on 
their supposed chilling effect.  That explanation, I will suggest, itself 
rests on the institutional strengths of legislatures as opposed to their 
weaknesses.  As Larry Alexander has explained, the overbreadth doc-
trine is justified on the basis of the chilling effect only when sever-
ance is inadequate.114  If those who plan to engage in conduct that 
may not constitutionally be burdened know that the application of 
the rule to them will be held invalid and severed, they will not be 
chilled.  Their constitutionally protected conduct will be deterred on-
ly when constitutional doctrine and the courts that administer it are 
likely to make mistakes.  Chilling will result from anticipated false 
negatives, in which the courts fail to properly identify impermissible 
applications.  A constitutional principle that makes overbroad rules 
wholly invalid will assure private people that they need not worry 
about the rule at all, and so need not worry about errors in severing it 
 
113 Although Linde stressed the text of the First Amendment, he did not address the point 
that the First Amendment itself applies only to Congress and not to the states.  A very sim-
ilar argument is available with respect to the states, provided that incorporation is ac-
complished through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which refers to laws.  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”). 
114 Larry Alexander, There Is No First Amendment Overbreadth (But There Are Vague First Amend-
ment Doctrines); Prior Restraints Aren’t “Prior”; and “As Applied” Challenges Seek Judicial Statuto-
ry Amendments, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 439, 439–41 (2011) (arguing that vague First 
Amendment tests chill free speech, not overbreadth). 
Nov. 2013] POWER, DUTY & FACIAL INVALIDITY 545 
 
(though they must worry about error in applying the overbreadth 
doctrine).115 
Overbreadth is a problem that constitutional doctrine and the 
courts that administer it cannot solve, so a legislature cannot solve it 
simply by including an ordinary severability clause.  But a legislature 
can avoid the problem by drafting more narrowly.  By doing so, the 
legislature can reduce the number of instances in which religious ex-
ercise or expression is restricted.  If there are fewer such instances, 
there will be fewer opportunities for the doctrine and the courts to 
err on the side of constitutionality.  Only the legislature can limit the 
opportunities to make mistakes because those opportunities arise in 
the application of legislative rules.  Courts and constitutional doc-
trine take the substance of the non-constitutional law as given, but 
legislatures have the power to change it.  The overbreadth doctrine 
reflects not just the incapacities of courts but the capacities of law 
makers. 
As Alexander emphasizes, an ordinary severability clause cannot 
cure overbreadth because an ordinary severability clause simply in-
vokes constitutional doctrine, and constitutional doctrine here is the 
problem, not the solution.116  In principle, a more circumstantial 
fallback rule could solve the problem and would go into effect if the 
primary rule were indeed overbroad.  Such detailed fallback rules are 
very rare, and their rarity accounts for the fact that overbroad rules 
regularly are invalid and are replaced, not with a back-up arrange-
ment, but with nothing. 
Perhaps the most important source of rule-level invalidity in cur-
rent doctrine is impermissible legislative purpose.117  A rule’s purpose 
operates as to every one of its applications, so an impermissible pur-
pose means that every application is ill founded.  This principle too 
rests on the characteristics of legislatures, including one of the cen-
tral strengths of legislatures.  Purpose-based invalidity is subject to the 
 
115 This account of the overbreadth doctrine assumes that it causes legislative rules to be in-
valid when they are adopted and not that it enables courts to make previously valid rules 
invalid.  Individuals who engage in conduct that could be burdened by a narrower rule 
benefit from overbreadth limitations even though their conduct is not the reason that 
those limitations exist, but that does not mean that they lack standing to raise the uncon-
stitutionality of the impermissibly overbroad rules that apply to them.  Invalid rules may 
not be applied. 
116 Id. at 441 (“[T]he vagueness of first amendment doctrines is the true source of the 
chilling effect [on speech] . . . .”). 
117 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993) 
(holding that the city council had the impermissible purpose of burdening religious ex-
ercise). 
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objection that the very same instance of conduct may be constitution-
ally protected or not, depending on the purpose of the rule that reg-
ulates it.  Regulated parties who are lucky enough to have badly-
motivated regulators have constitutional protection; those regulated 
by the innocent do not.  If the First Amendment is about people’s 
ability to express themselves or exercise their religion, it is hard to see 
why legislators’ motives should matter.118 
Legislators’ reasons for acting, however, matter enormously in a 
democracy.  Legislators are selected because the voters have confi-
dence in those reasons.  If a legal rule is adopted for some reason, 
and only that reason, the legislators’ judgment is that, absent that 
reason, the legal system as a whole would be better without the rule.  
Particular rules, thus, are adopted because legislatures conclude that 
the rule will produce some good at the margin, compared to the legal 
system without the rule.  To say that the First Amendment makes 
some purpose impermissible is to say that the Constitution contains a 
judgment that the achievement of the purpose would be undesirable.  
As far as the Constitution is concerned, producing the result that the 
legislature desires with that rule is bad and not good.  If the Constitu-
tion overrides the legislature’s conclusion that the marginal effect of 
a rule is good, the remaining legislative judgment is that the legal sys-
tem without the rule was fine.  Different results depending on legisla-
tive purpose are not arbitrary but reflect the principle that, subject to 
constitutional limitations, legislators decide what the law should be. 
By way of example, suppose that a state legislature bans littering in 
order to make it more difficult to distribute political leaflets, and only 
for that purpose.  That means that in the legislature’s judgment, 
banning littering is not worth the trouble except for its effect on po-
litical leafleting.  If the Constitution means that reducing political 
leafleting is undesirable in and of itself, and hence an impermissible 
purpose, then once the impermissible purpose is subtracted, the re-
 
118 This objection to purpose-based, rule-level invalidity is an instance of a more general ob-
jection to rule-level invalidity, which is that it produces different results for the same regu-
lated conduct depending on the rule that is applied.  See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Rules, 
Rights, Options, and Time, 6 LEGAL THEORY 391, 393 (2000) (illustrating that a criminal 
prosecution for the exact same offense may produce differing results depending on the 
rules that are applied in the proceeding).  Alexander makes the point that the Constitu-
tion, by leaving so many policy questions open, assigns great importance to legislative 
bodies.  Id. at 398 (“[Optional application of rules] accounts for the relative importance 
the Constitution gives to the legislative bodies, their selection and their powers”).  His 
explanation of rule-level constitutional norms, which I believe is consistent with mine, 
does not rely on the interaction between legislative and constitutional judgments con-
cerning desirable results the way mine does. 
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maining legislative judgment is that banning littering is not worth-
while.  By contrast, a ban on littering adopted for permissible pur-
poses, and so valid, reflects a different legislative judgment, according 
to which, reducing littering is worthwhile without regard to its effects 
on expression.  Representative government is supposed to produce 
different policy results depending on the different judgments of rep-
resentatives.119 
Inquiry into purpose has built into it inquiry into fallback rules.  
To conclude that a rule has only an impermissible purpose implies 
that it would not have been adopted had the legislature known that it 
could not pursue that goal.  The back-up rule is no rule at all. 
In both its text and its doctrinal elaboration, the First Amendment 
is about the decisions of legislatures, decisions that take the form of 
general prescriptions and not specific applications.  It imposes disa-
bilities on Congress, from which immunities of individuals follow.  
The First Amendment is a rule about rules. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 The seeming arbitrariness comes from neglecting the aspects of legislative choice that are 
constrained by the Constitution.  Although legislators may not act on impermissible pur-
poses, they are free to decide whether to pursue permissible purposes or not. 
